THEPOWERSTRUCTURE
OF THE THREE
AFFILIATED TRIBES

This paper originated from my discussions with a tribal elder of the Three Affiliated
Tribes (TAT) during the summer of 2000. Concerned about the balance of powers in the Three
Affiliated Tribes' Indian Reorganization Act Constitution, the elder asked me whether I would
review the TAT Constitution. I chose to use this subject for my writing requirement at the
University of New Mexico School of Law. In March of 2001, I was priviieged to meet with the

Mandan Hidatsa and Arikara Elders Organization, and this organization formally agreed to
sponsor my paper.

'

This group, known as the MHA Elders, was chartered under the Three Affiliated Tribes'
govenunent. The group named itself the "MHA Elders" or the Mandan, Hidatsa, and Arikara
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Elders. On principle, the group avoided naming itself the Three Affiliated Tribes Elders because
the name "Three Affiliated Tribes" was given to the Three Tribes by the federal government.
This organization is comprised of segment representatives and a chairman.
The purpose of the MHA Elders is to represent the voice of the tribal elders and to
manage a budget for health care and other old age issues. During this meeting, I listened to the
elders discuss health care issues and their concern for the elders &om their respective
communities.
The subject of the meeting turned to another issue of the MHA Elders, the Three
Affiliated Tribes7Indian Reorganization Act Constitution. I listened to two competing groups
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tell their stories. First, 1 listened to some members express heartfelt disappointment in their
current structure of government because in their view the govemment leaders didn't listen to
other voices and were too powerful. In addition, they objected to the form of government whlch
placed almost all of the power in one Tribal Business Council and didn't provide for meaninghl
ways to participation in govemment. They felt that if the government were divided into three
branches: legislative, executive, and judicial, there would be less tyranny in the government.
They also expressed dissatisfaction with the current form of government arguing that it was
imposed by the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) with little input from the Three Affiliated Tribes'
People, particularly the elders. They also expressed concern over the Tribal Council's current
system of hiring and firing tribal employees.
This group feels it is traditional for the elders to influence poIitics and the government of
the Tribe. These members intend to use the MHA Elders organization as a vehicle for a grass
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roots movement to rethink and redesign the IRA Constitution. In particular, they want the new
government to balance the traditional values of the People with the contemporary values. For
example, this group supports the traditional value of active participation by the People and a
relatively new value of the People, capitalism.

I also listened to other elders, many of whom had previously served on the Tribal
Business Council for the TAT. They expressed great pride in the TAT government and in one

another. They stated that the TAT govemment had always been a role model for other tribal
governments. They also heard their elders tell them that the government was modeled after the
Tribe's traditional government. This group has full trust in the Council to update the

Constitution as needed and feels a grass roots movement would detract fiom the MHA Elders
specific charter: to help the govemment with old age issues.
.T-

This battle of views over the Tribal Constitution originates from the Indian

r'

Reorganization Act (IRA)passed in 1934. The IRA authorized tribes to organize under a
constitution for their "common welfare" and authorized tribes to incorporate under a federal
charter.' Although Congress, through the IRA,encouraged tribes to draft their own constitutions
and laws, "most tribal constitutions were drafted by the Bureau of Indian Affairs without tribal

input and consequently reflected little, if any, direct local ~oncern."~
Because of the
participation of the BIA, today there are several distinctive provisions in the typical IRA
constitution. First, the IRA constitutions often lack cultural values and tribal input. Second,
most IRA constitutions placed all power in an elected tribal council and "did not provide for any
separation of powers.'A Third, the constitutions "did not specifically create any court system."'
Fourth, most IRA constitutions lack a bill of rights. Finally, tribal members note that the IRA
constitutions, written in the 1930's, are not compatible with "self governance in the 21'' century"
/-'

and with the current federal policy of tribal self-~etermination.~
However, since the BIA, and
not Congress suggested this format, tribes are free to amend their constitutions to include their
own provisions and to institutionalize their own traditional systems of
This paper explores the effect of the Indian Reorganization Act on the Three Affiliated

Tribes: The Mandan, Hidatsa, and Arikara Nations of Fort Berthold, North Dakota. As in most

IRA constitutions, the current structure of the Three Affiliated Tribes' system of government
places most of the power in the Tribal Council. The main purpose of this paper is to invite tribal
discussion within the MHA Elders and among the Three Tribes as to whether the TAT should
See 25 U.S.C. 55476-477 (1934). It also stopped the allotment of Indian lands and extended any existing trust and
alienation restrictions on Indian allotments. See 25 U.S.C.
3461 (1934).
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For f i e r discussion, see generally, Frank Pornrnersheim, A Path Near rhe Clearing: An Essay on Cor~stitutional
Adjudication in Tribal Courts, 27 Gonz. L. Rev. 393,396-397 (1 992).
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adopt a constitutional form of separation of powers. h the course of the discussion, various

,n\
divisions of governmental powers will be discussed. This will include the internal structure of
govemental powers but also other considerations such as the historical structure of
governmental power and other external governmental powers over which the Tribe has little
control, such as federal policy.
This paper also makes comparisons to the federal model of separation of powers for
several reasons. The first reason is to formulate a basic understanding of the meaning of
separation of powers. Second, this paper attempts to explain the values behind the federal mode1
of separation of powers so that a determination can be made as to whether the federal modej of
separation of powers is appropriate for the Three Affiliated Tribes. Finally, this paper attempts
to see what values were behind the historical structure of separation of powers of the Three
Affiliated Tribes and to see whether these values are appropriate in today's government. Also,
r'.

the current views of the People supporting separation of powers will be discussed.

Part I of this paper begins with the history of the Three Affiliated Tribes. Part 17. explores
the values of separation of powers in the federal constitution. Part III addresses the historical
government separation of powers. Part IV demonstrates how federal policy impacts the amount

of power that the Tribal government can dispense. Parts V and VI, the heart of the paper,
delineate the current separation of powers in the internal government structure and ways in
which the values underlying separation of powers could be institutionalized in the Three
Affiliated Tribes' Constitution. Part VII addresses the division of power between the IRA
government and the civil rights of its People. Part VIU compares the traditional government
with the current governmental structure of power. In conclusion, Part IX briefly discusses what

changes could be implemented to balance the powers of government and how these changes

r'.

could be implemented.
1.

HISTORYOF THE THREE
AFFILIATED TRIBES

The Fort Berthold Reservation is home to the Hidatsa, Mandan, and Arikara Nations,
which are collectively known as the Three Affiliated Tribes. The Three Affiliated Tribes are a
people of the Great Plains of the North Central states. Unlike other Plains Tribes which relied
solely on the buffalo for sustenance, the Three Tribes also relied on agriculture and lived in
permanent earth villages during the summer.* Although the Three Tribes frequently visited one
another, traded, and sometimes warred, there was no official union until 1 8 6 2 . ~
Historically, the Hidatsa were once the same Tribe as the

row.'^

The Hidatsa and

Mandan claim to have always lived along the upper Missouri ~ i v e r . ' ' Both the Mandans and
Hidatsas moved into the area of the present Reservation in 1845.12These two Nations have a
f-'

similar Siouan language and culture. In fact, early traders frequently grouped the Tribes and
villages together because they were unable to distinguish them.I3
The Arikara have different origins than the Hidatsa and Mandan, as they originated From
the Pawnee Tribe, of the Caddoan language family.14 The Arikara separated fiom the Pawnee
and came north along the Missouri. Eventually, The Arikara joined the Mandan and Hidatsa for
mutual protection against the Sioux.
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In 1782 the first smallpox epidemic decimated the Three Tribes and it has been estimated
/-'

that the population was cut in half.'' In 1794, the first fur-trading post was established by the
North West Company among the Three ~ r i b e s . 'More
~
non-Indians explored this territory in the
late 1790's and early 1800's. Lewis and Clark traveled up the Missouri River on their voyage
through the Louisiana Territory and met with the Arikaras in October 1804." During the winter
of 1804-1805, Lewis and Clark also stayed with the Mandan and Hidatsa Tribes. During this
visit, they hired Charbonneau, and his wife, Sakakawea, a Hidatsa, as interpreters.''
In June of Z 837, the second smallpox epidemic hit the Three Tribes. This time, the

Mandan were hit the hardest because they remained in the village with their dead.I9 The Hidatsa
moved away to escape the diseases. "Many committed suicide because they felt they had no
chance to sur~ive."~'

In 1851, Chief Four Bears went to the meeting with the federal government at Fort
,P

Laramie. He went to secure a Treaty for the Hidatsa and the Mandan Tribes that would protect
and preserve the Tribes' sacred sites.21 One of the MHA Elders, John Fredericks, has described

this meeting:
My thoughts sort of drifted to the past and as far back as I could remember, then it
drifted far back to the time that our Chiefs had to get on their horses and go to
Lararnie, Wyoming for the big gathering of our chiefs and the white mans chiefs
(leadership) for the purpose of negotiating out an agreement on how they might
live together in this country. Its [sic] hard to imagine what must have been on
their minds, and what they talked about around the camp fires as they journeyed
toward that historical gathering. They knew that their people were used to
journeying many miles for warmer better climates during cold winters and to
IS
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for the Mandans").
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better hunting grounds and also to pray and worship at various places that our
early people utilized for that purpose. The burden on our chiefs had to be very
heavy and of deep concern to them. You know as I know, that they did a pretty
good job in their negotiations with the Federal Government that provided an area
that our tribes could still move around good in carrying out their traditional
livelihood. An area, fiom the black Hills in South Dakota nearly to the Canadian
border to the north, and from the Missouri River west to the Powder River in
Montana (to make it short). Thus the Fort Laramie Treaty of 1851 was signed and
ratified."
However, as a result of several Executive Orders that changed its boundaries, today the
. ~1887,
~
the
Reservation, consisting of 930,000 acres, is located in western North ~ a k o t a In
Dawes Act provided for individual allotments to tribal members and many non-Indians
purchased allotments within the Fort Berthold ~ e s e r v a t i o n . ~ ~

In 1936, the Three Affiliated Tribes ratified a Constitution and Bylaws by a close vote of
366 for and 220 against.25 On June 29, 1936 Harold Ickes, Secretary of the Interior, approved

the Three Affiliated Tribes Indian Reorganization Act Constitution and Bylaws.
,P\

In 1954, the federal government built the Garrison Dam and flooded the Missouri River,
~ ~ flooding of the Missouri k v e r
which runs through the Fort Berthold ~ e s e r v a t i o n .The
destroyed the original communities and engulfed the Tribe's sacred low lands, creating Lake
~ a k a k a w e a .Few
~ ~ bridges exist over the lake and the effect has been the creation of six new
isolated segments on the Reservation. Today, these six segments form the basis for tribal
government. Each segment elects a Councilman and the people elect a Chairman at large.28
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Today both Indians and non-Indians live within the Fort Berthold Reservation in a
checkerboard arrangement. There are approximately 4,000 Indians residing on the Reservation,
of approximately 8,000 enrolled rnernber~.'~
1.

VALUESIN SEPARATION
OF POWERS
IN THE FEDERALMODEL

This section briefly examines federal separation of powers. First, this section explains

the views of government that influenced the framers in crafting the federal constitution. Second,
and most importantly, this section uncovers the values behind federal separation of powers. The
values discussion is critical because the TAT must decide whether it too holds the same values
and therefore whether it would be appropriate to incorporate the federal model of separation of

powers into its JRA Constitution. Finally, this section briefly explores the technical aspects of
the federal model of separation of powers.
Separation of powers protects one core value: the protection of individual liberty from

r-governmental tyranny.30 The framers wanted to create a government free of tyranny. To do this,
the framers studied two periods in history: the period in classical Roman and Greek hlstory from

509 B.C. to 27 B.C. and the period in the late 17' and early 1gth centuries known as the "Age of
~nli~htenment."~'
The first theory studied by the framers was taken from the Greeks and Romans and is

sometimes labeled "classical republicanism."32 Under the classical republicanism model, men
were perceived as generally good civic-minded people. Together these men could institute a
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government, whereby public servants would put the good of the community before that of any

P

one man.33
The fiarners also studied a second theory supported by the natural rights philosopher,

In the
~ o c k e Under
. ~ ~ this theory, men by nature were reasonable but "self-intere~ted."~~
absence of a government, the stronger men would rule the weaker men in the society.36
Government, therefore, was a social contract whereby individuals gave up some control to the
government which served to protect man's rights to his own property and liberty.37
When the framers of the constitution considered what type of government they wanted,
they considered the above theories of government. They also sought to avoid the tyranny of
England that reigned during the colonial period.38 They also sought to avoid a life where
property and governmental rights were determined by birth into a particular class of people as it
was in ~ n ~ 1 a n dThe
. l ~ framers looked instead to a model where each person could participate in
P.

government no matter what his station or class in society and where each person could pursue
life, liberty, and property.40

Id. at 13-14.
Id. at 2 (stating ''The natural rights philosophy is based on imagining what life would be like if there were no
government.").
35 id. at 4.
33

34

36 id.

Id. at 6.
Id. at 42-43.
39 ~ dat. 5 .
40 It has been argued by Jack Weatherford that the early Europeans and Americans were influenced by their
perceptions that the Indians possessed true liberty:
38

The most consistent theme in the descriptions penned about the New World was amazement at the
Indians' personal liberty, in particular their freedom from rulers and from social classes based on
ownership of property. For the frrst time the French and the British became aware of the
possibility of living in social harmony and property without the rule of a King.
During this era the thinkers of Europe forged the ideas that became known as the European
Enlightenment, and much of its light came from the torch of Indian liberty.. ..
JACK WEATHEWORD,IND~ANGIVERS HOW THEINDIANS OF THE AMERICAS
TRANSFORMED
THE WORLD
121-122, 124 (1988). However, it may also be true that the Europeans and early Americans' perceptions

The federal model generally favored h c k e ' s view over classical republicanism and the
F-'

fiamers strove to protect the value of individual liberty by creating several restraints on
government. The framers created their own principIe of separation of powers by combining two
technical structures for government: separation of powers and checks and balances."

These

two "organizing principles," separation of powers and checks and balances, are actually quite
different.42 The first organizational concept is that the government is divided into separate
branches and that each has its own powers.43 Separation of powers is most usually attributed to
Montesquieu. Be wrote of the separation between the legislative and executive functions:
"When the legislative and executive powers are united in the same person, or in the same body of
magistracy, there can be then no liberty; because apprehensions may arise, lest the same monarch
or senate should enact tyrannical laws, to execute them in a tyrannical manner.'#

Montesquieu

also wrote of the necessity fox a separate judiciary:
r'

Again, there is no liberty, if the power of judging be not separated from the
legislative and executive powers. Were it joined with the legislative, the life and
liberty of the subject would be exposed to arbitrary control; for the judge would
be then the legislator. Were it joined to the executive power, the judge might
behave with all the violence of an oppressor.45
The second concept is that the branches share powers and must cooperate in some
s . ~ ~Madison, one
respects and check the power of the other two branches in other ~ e s ~ e c tJames

,-

were not fully accurate because the clan relationships that exist in most tribes were probably not visible to
casual observers.
4' Although I have used the term "technical structures," to refer to the implementation of separation of powers and
checks and balances, the Supreme Court has rejected construing the federal constitution's division of powers in a
technical manner, In fact, separation of powers is more of a "'political doctrine"' rather than a technical rule of law.
See JOHNE.NOWAK& RONALDD. ROTUNDA,
CONS~TUTIONALLAW129-130 (5& ed. 1995) (footnote omitted).
42 FARBER,ESKNDGE & FRICKEY,
supra note 30, at 905.
43 Id.
44
Gerhard Casper, An Essay in Separation ofPowers: Some Early Versions and Practices, 30 Wrn & Mary L. Rev.
21 1 , 2 12-22 (1989) reprinted in DANIEL
A. FARBER,WILLIAM
N.ESKRIDGE,
JR. & PHILIPP. FRICKEY,
CONSTI~UTIONALLAW
THEMES
FOR THE CONSTITUTION'S
THIRD
CENTURY
910 (Znd ed. 1998).
45 id.
46 FARBER,
E s ~ E& ,FRICKEY,
supra note 30, at 905 (stating checks and balances is "the notion that each of the
three branches shall have some influence on how the other two branches perform their specialized roles.").

of the framers of the federal constitution, defended the integration of the two concepts because
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he felt the combination would better protect individual liberty.47 In fact, the combination allows
both positive and negative protections fiom tyranny. First, checks and balances provides for a
positive protection because it requires the action of more than one branch, thus making it "more
likely that the action will be reasonable and just."'

Second, separation of powers provides for a

negative protection from tyranny. For example, "legislators will be more reluctant to pass unfair
statutes, out of fear that tyrannical laws could be used against them and their supporters. On the
other hand, if unfair laws were passed, they might be implemented in ways that avoid their most
tyrannical feat~res.'*~

The framers used the constitution as a tool to implement these two concepts.
Interestingly, the framers never used the words "separation of powers" or "checks and balances"
in the federal constitution. First, the framers divided the government into three branches: the
r
'
.

Legislative, Executive, and the ~ u d i c i a r ~ . Second,
'~
the framers provided that in some
instances, the branches must share power. There are times when the legislative and executive
branches must work with one another. For example, the President must sign the bills of
Congress before they become law.51 In addition, the President can veto the bill but a 213
majority vote of both houses can override the President's veto.52 There are also times when the
legislative branch controls the judicial power. For example, although the judicial power is vested

Id. at 906.
Id. at 907.
49 Id.
50 Article I vests the legislative power in a Congress which consists of both the Senate and the House of
Representatives. U.S. CONST.art. I, § 1. Most of the legislative powers are outlined in Article I, $ 8. U.S. CONST.
art I, 5 8. Article I1 vests the executive power in the President. U.S. CONST.art. 11, $ I. Art I1 states most of the
powers of the President. U.S. CONST.art. 11. Article 111vests all power in one Supreme Court. U.S. CONST.art. 111,
f ,I. Art. 111, $2 outlines the extent of the judicial power. U.S. CONST.art. 111, $ 2.
U.S. CONST. art. I, $ 7 cl. 2, 3.
~ d .
47
48

in one Supreme Court, Congress must create the lower courts.53 Only the Supreme Court is
."
\,

"constitutionally guaranteed."54

In some circumstances, all three branches must work together to accomplish a result. The
core example is that the legislature makes the laws, the executive enforces the laws, and the
judiciary interprets the laws.55 h o t h e r example is the President's ability to appoint the Justices
of the Supreme Court with the advice of the

Through these provisions, the branches

check one another and no branch becomes tyrannical over the others. Therefore, the government
cannot oppress the people.
However, the downside to the protection of individual liberty is a less efficient
government. For example, not only does it take two branches of government, the legislature and
the executive branches, to enact a law, but the Tramers also required bicarnera~isrn.~~
If the
h e r s had better faith in public servants, then the fiamers might also have created a more
r
'

efficient government. For example, a government where the executive and legislative are unified
can enact and implement laws more efficiently.

Two other restraints were included in the federal constitution. First, the framers decided
that the federal government would be a government of limited powers.58 The balance of powers
between the governments of the states and the federal government is known as federali~rn.~~

U.S. CONST, art. 111, 5 1.
JEROME A. BARRON
& C. THOMAS
DENES,CONSTITU~ONAL
LAWM A NUTSHELL
1 1 (4' ed. 1999).
"U.S. CON ST.^^^^, 8 7cl.2,3; art.11, 5 3; an.111, 4 2.
56 U.S. CONST.
art. 11, 5 2, cl. 2.
57 U.S. CONST.
art I, 5 7 cl. 2,3; art. 11, § 3; art. 111, 5 2.
58
BARRON& DIENES,supra note 54 at 64 (stating "[ulnder our Constitution, all powers not delegated to the national
government under the Tenth Amendment are retained by the states and the people. This is a basic premise of the
division of powers, 'OurFederalism"').
59 Id.; cf. WEATHERFORD,
supra note 40 at 135. Weatherford states:
54

Reportedly, the first person to propose a union of all the colonies and to propose a federal model
for it was the Iroquois chief Canassatego, speaking at an Indian-British assembly in Pennsylvania
in July 1744. He complained that the Indians found it difficult to deal with so many different
colonial administrations, each with its own policy.

r'

Second, the framers added a bill of rights which delineated the rights of citizens and the limits of
govemment actionm60
Imposing the federal model of separation of powers on the Three Affiliated Tribes might
also imposes all of the values that go along with the principle. Therefore, it is imperative that the
Three Affiliated Tribes debate and discover which values it holds dear prior to adopting any
model of separation of powers.

In summary, the federal model is based on several values: the protection of individual
liberty, and the idea that every person has the right to pursue life, liberty, and property. This also
evidences that the fiamers had a general distrust of govemment and preferred a slow, reflective
government with divided and shared powers over a faster, more efficient govemment.
Accordingly, the TAT must determine whether it holds the same respect for the values of
individual liberty and individual rights as did the fiamers. This is particularly true for tribes,
' -f,

such as the TAT, that are organized into clan relation~hi~s.~'
The TAT must also determine
whether the benefits of separation of powers would outweigh the tradeoffs, such as inefficiency.
It is also important to consider what values are evident from the traditional model of
separation of powers discussed in the next section. It will also be important to discover whether
these traditional values have changed in light of the Self-Determinationera and in light of
increasing influence by the federal and state governments.

This section focuses on the historic government structure of the Three Tribes. In
determining how any govemment should function within a society, it is important to understand

,n

$$tation omitted). Canassatego suggested the colonies model their union after the League of the Iroquois. Id.
U.S. CONST.amend. I-X.
6' See POMMERSHEIM, supra note 3, at 1 16-119 (discussing the problems of individual rights within tribal
communities particularly when the community "holds 'relatedness' to be a central value.. ..") (footnote omitted).

r.

how the society's governmental structure began. History is particularly important as background
for the IRA which was often accepted without great concern for traditional tribal organization.
Furthermore, it has been stated that, "Indian culture is a resource that strengthens tribal
government.. .[and] a match between institutions of government and culture also matters to
[economic] success."

62

It is important to understand which values the Tribes held before they

were introduced to a federal styled government. A short comparison of the traditional
government with the IRA government is discussed in Part VIII.
Village Council

During the period between 1500-1851, each of the Three Tribes hnctioned separately.
All Three Tribes had relatively similar governments. Indeed, each Tribe had several villages,
each of which was self-governing, with its own Village Council. "The council's duties were
broad and involved matters concerning the people at large: moving the village; the time of
,P

leaving for the summer buffalo hunt and the various camping places along the away; the
prohibition on leaving the village for warfare; peace treaties with neighboring tribes.. .[and]
policies with respect to the White traders and Government officials."63
The Village Council "was of indefinite size" because the membership depended upon
"personal achievement and public acc~aim."~
The members of the Council usually came into
power with the consent of pubIic opinion, usually after a progression through the age societies,
~ ~ was an age and maturity
or by courage in battle, or participation in religious ~ e r e m o n i e s .There
prerequisite; the council members had to be older than the Black Mouths, or the police force.
The Black Mouths were mature members between 28-45 years of age.

62

See Overview, Harvard Project on American Indian Economic Development, www.harvard.edulh~aiedoverview.
1 BOWERS,supra note 1 1, at 186.
64 ~ dat. 33.
'*Id. at 32-33.
63

Indeed, age requirements fostered development in the entire organization of the Tribes. It
(PX.,

was thought that the elders always held a special place in leadership and education of the
community. For example, John Fredericks, a MHA Elder, noted that,
During one of our meetings, one of the elders from Mandaree was expounding on
how important the Elders of the Tribes were in the past. He went on to say that
the main chiefs sat in the middle of the gathering then sub-chiefs, then the clan
representatives and Medicine Men, etc. They spoke to their people about life and
how they were taught to live it by their Elders, e t ~ . ~ ~

Peace and War Chiefs
There was a degree of separation of powers in the village government. Along with the
Council, two council members emerged to lead the village: a peace chief and a war chief. The
peace chief was one that had "important ceremonial bundles" and held the esteem of the people.

The war chief was one who had a good war records6' These two leaders were usually selected by
merit; however, at times hereditary chiefs came into power, particularly because ceremonial

,

bundle rights were passed fiom father to son.68Younger men eventually replaced these two
chiefs; they were never demotedm6'
Although charged with different duties, these two leaders were expected to work together
for the good of the people. The Mandans chose two leaders whose skills were
The war chief was in charge of the defense of the village; while the peace
chief was in charge of day to day activities, trade with other nations, and supervising visits with
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other tribes." In Mandan way, the two chiefs were sometimes chosen one from each of two
organizations of clans called rn~ieties.~'
The two chiefs used the power of persuasion to convince the Village Council or Council
of Older Men, to adopt their views. The chief "was, first of all, an orator who in council, after
enumerating his various accomplishments to demonstrate the extent to which he had worked for
the welfare of the entire village, then offered an opinion as to the wisdom of a certain act or

A chiefs power was measured by how well he united the village and by the fortune
during his tenure. If a chief could not maintain unity, bands often split fiom the group and

returned if they respected the new successor.74
Representation
Every household had a voice in Council meetings. A household could send one elder to
the meeting to give input to the Viliage

The Village Council attempted to use

P

persuasion to reach unanimous decisions. Sometimes one household would fail to agree to the
proposed action. Usually, this veto power ended the Village Council's d i s c u ~ s i o n . ~ ~
Accordingly, individual households had a powerfbl voice. However, in other situations, the
Village Council proceeded without unanimous consent. After a time, disgruntled families
sometimes decided to part ways and formed their own band.77
Appointed Leaders

The Council appointed special leaders for a defined duration. Every man aspired to be a
leader for a special task and even the chiefs were expected to follow the mandates of appointed

Id.
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Id. at 34-35.
Id. at 36.
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76 Id. at 34.
77 l'i.
73

74

1eade1-s.78For example, the Village Council appointed a leader in charge of the summer buffalo
,-

hunt. The Council selected this leader based upon a man's ability to find buffalo herds as well as
his good judgment. It was expected that he had obtained his ability in degrees.79 The Council
selected the leader of the summer hunt "a month before the village was to leave for the summer
hunt."80 This person had full authority for the duration of the planning of the hunt which
continued through the end of the hunt. However, this individual sought the advice of the Council
regularly.'' His lodge became the meeting place of the Council during preparation for the hunt.

The Village Council also appointed separate winter leaders when the village parted into several
smaller winter camps.

The Police Force
The Black Mouths, a Mandan age society, served as the village police force by enforcing
the regulations of the Village Council, the two chiefs, and special leaders.82 This was the most

f'

hlghly developed age society and it met every two or three days. Membership in the Black
Mouths was purchased from current Black Mouths. Purchasers had progressed through younger
age societies and when it was felt they were mature enough, the current Black Mouths sold the
society to the next generation.83
"Unlike some Plains tribes where the responsibilities of group management were passed
around from society to society, the Hidatsa and Mandan village groups entrusted police duties to
one society, the Black ~ o u t h s . "In~ addition
~
to regulation enforcement, the Black Mouths
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"remove[d] any misunderstandings among fellow-villagers."85 They also attended all matters of
public importance to ensure the safety of the village.86 The Black Mouth Society also announced

a particular leader was in charge, the Black
the decisions of the Council to the ~ e o ~ l e . When
*'
Mouths served lum and enforced his mandates." For example, if the leader of the summer hunt
called for a no-hunt ban, the Black Mouths enforced this decree.89
The Black Mouths also helped to resolve community matters. If for example, members
of the community plotted revenge for the death of one of their own family members, "the Black
Mouths would gather together property and offer it to the aggrieved people, fill a pipe for them
to smoke, and by gentle words would conciliate them and cause them to give up projects of
revenge.""
The Black Mouths also regulated visits with other villages and with other tribes.91 They
regulated the number of young men that could leave on war expeditions so that the village would
P

not be left defenseless. They recalled war parties when word was sent that an "alien group was

They could also deliver quick and stem punishment to offenders.93 Each member
"carried a club" and was authorized to use it if someone broke one of the chiefs' regulations.
Interestingly, both the age society and clan system served to guard against excesses by the Black
Mouths. Due to the great amount of trust placed in the Black Mouth Society, as well as their
ability to deliver swift punishment, care was taken to ensure that the men were of mature age
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before they were allowed to purchase the membership rights of the

This became the

principal means to c u b improper use of power by the Black ~ o u t h s Another
. ~ ~ form of control
over the Black Mouths was through clan regulation. If a Black Mouth's punishment was too
harsh, for example, his cIan might tease him.96
Clans and Women.

Each Tribe functioned under a hghly developed matrilineal clan system. 97 The clan
system regulated social interaction and in some ways checked the power of the government,
particularly the Black Mouths. In addition, although the Village Council and the Black Mouths
regulated hunting and trade, the women regulated farming and gardening.98 The women were
also responsibIe for constructing the earth lodges.99 See Figure 1.
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People
The People delegated power to the Village Council and Appointed Leaders as well as the Black
Mouths.
The People were also organized into matrilineal clans and gender age societies.
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Figure 1: Historical Structure of
Government.

Alliances
Sometime between 1797 and 1798, three Hidatsa Village Councils formed one Iarge
Tribal

The membership of the Tribal Council was between 10 and 12 rnernber~.'~'

The duties of the Tribal Council included war powers, peace powers, and other duties as

loo
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necessary for mutual assistance of the three villages.'02 The Chiefs also used the power of
persuasion to obtain consensus fiom the Council members and the people.103The Hidatsa Tribal
Council had its flaws but it was quite effective for the common good.'w It i s unclear when the
Tribal Council officially ended but the Village Councils remained in effect throughout the
alliance and afterward.
The historical village governments remained separate until 1845, when the three Hidatsa
villages joined with one Mandan group at Like a Fish Hook village.Io5 They lived there for
about 40 years, from 1845 until 1885, when the federal government moved the people onto
individual a l l ~ t r n e n t s . 'In
~ ~1862, the Three Tribes officiallyjoined one another in a formal
union.'07 There were also varying degrees of unions among the Three Tribes prior to this date.
The most common reason the T h e e Tribes allied themselves was for protection against the
~ i o u x . On
' ~ ~the other hand, the Tribes often fiercely guarded their territory along the Missouri

/I

River and would prevent other tribes (including one another) from moving up or downstrea~n.'~~

Analysis of Historical Government
The Three Tribes had sophisticated local village governments with a form of separation
of powers. Interestingly, there were up to four separate branches of government: the Village
Council, the two chiefs, the appointed leaders, and the People. These in turn were regulated by
and drawn f7om the clans and age societies. The two chiefs had separate functions: the war
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River).
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chief was in charge of defense while the peace chief was in charge of day to day activities. The
Council acted as the policymaker. The Black Mouths acted as the executive branch.

In addition, there were also checks and balances. First and foremost, public opinion
seemed to grant power to the chiefs, the Council, and to curb the Black Mouths. The Council
also checked the activities of the special leaders by holding the appointment power. The
appointed leaders usually acted with the advice of the Village Council. The Village Council and
chiefs collaborated to use persuasion to obtain the consent of the People. The Age Societies
shared power with the government, by controlling the purchase of the Black Mouth Society.
From this system, the following values can be inferred. First, the Three Tribes valued
religion and ceremony. Second, they valued group rights through clans and age societies. Third,
they valued participation in government either through appointment to particular positions,
service on the Council, or participation in the age societies. They also valued the right of the

r..
People, particularly elders, to speak before the Council and to voice both support and opposition

to the Council. Although the Tribes generally valued consensus, they also valued the right of
bands to separate. This could be a value of a different kind of liberty; the TAT People only
followed the leaders in which they had faith.

fv.

BALANCE
OF POWERS
BETWEEN THE THREE
AFFILIATED
TRIBES
AND THE FEDERAL
GOVERNMENT

This section outlines the balance of power between the Three Tribes and the federal
government. This balance of power has continually changed since the first time that the federal
government involved itself with the Three Tribes. In general, these shifts in federal power and
their effect on the Tribes are known as the "policy periods."
Four great occurrences dominate Indian law, history and policy and they are
better understood in terms of time periods than doctrines. They are the existence

of aboriginal culture and sovereignty during pre-Colurnbian times; the location of
separate Indian societies on reservations; the imposition of assimilationist
policies, including the opening of most reservations to settlement by non-Indians;
and the efforts of Indians during the last quarter century to reverse the press of
assimilation by reestablishing viable, separate sovereignties in Indian country.'

Interestingly, the Tribes had the least control over the balance of power with the federal
government. Accordingly, the traditional governments were heavily influenced by changes in

the federal hdian policy periods: the Indian Wars, Allotment, World War II, the Missouri River
Basin Dam Project, the Indian Reorganization Act, and the current federal policy of tribal SelfDetermination.

Indian Wars and Indian Agents (1851-1880)
One of the first upsets to the Three Affiliated Tribes' government was its decision to ally
with the federal government. The stress of the Indian wars and the use of Indian Agents had

P\, strained the traditional governments. In 1851, after the Treaty of Fort Laramie, the federal
governrnent officially established the boundaries of the Three ~ribes.'" In 1864, the federal
government assigned a federal agent to the Three Tribes, the Assiniboine, and the Crow. After
1870, the federal government assigned the Three Tribes its own agent.'12
Throughout the 1860's and beyond, the Three Tribes were a1.lieswith the federal
government because they needed protection from the ~ioux.'l 3 The Tribes were frequently

attacked by the Sioux yet also asked by the Sioux to join them in fighting the federal
government.' l 4 This period has been described as ''the period of greatest danger for the three
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tribes and a time when their very existence hung in the balance."'15 They were also at the mercy
r'.

of cormpt h r traders and Indian agents."6 Matters grew worse during the United States Civil

War in 1861, because the federal government focused its efforts on the war and did not aid the
Three ~ribes.'" In 1876, Sitting Bull tried to influence the Tribes into fighting the Whites with

him. The Arikara, instead choose to join the federal govement in fighting against the Sioux in
the Battle of the Little Big

om."*

In 1874, the Three Affiliated Tribes escaped relocation. The Commissioner of Indian
Affairs, Edward P. Smith, considered moving the Three Tribes to Indian Territory in Oklahoma.
He "felt that the lands of Ft. Berthofd were unproductive, the climate [was] unftiendly, fuel
supplies [were] scarce and with 'the flood, drought, frost, and the marauding Sioux, he suggested
they would be better off in Oklahoma. ""l 9 The Three Affiliated Tribes sent a delegation to
investigate the Indian Territory. The delegation returned and decided not to move because they
,n

loved their homeland, stating they would prefer to "'work a little harder and have less"' to keep
their location.120

The Allotment Era (1881-1933)
In the 1870's and 1880's the federal government, through its Indian agents, began a
campaign to make the Three Tribes into "civilized" white

farmer^.'^'

The federal government

used several techniques: mandatory schooling, Christianity, rations, and allotment. Any parents
that refused to send their children to school were denied rations.122School children were not
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allowed to look like Indians and had to wear fiontier clothing. Young men had to cut their hair.
,r-\

The children were punished for engaging in tribal customs.'23
During this time, the government also attempted to stop the ceremonies of the Three
Tribes and to introduce them to Christianity. The Fort Berthold Indian Agent William Courtenay
stated that the federal government should end '"tribal organization, dances, ceremonies, and tomfoolery"' and if the Indians failed to work, they should

Fortunately, this proposal was

never hlly implemented but its basic idea was consistent with federal policy. In spite of the
federal government's campaign for education and Christian religion, the Three Tribes continued
to practice traditional values.125
The next upset was the introduction of forced individual land ownership. The federal
government passed the Dawes Act in 1887, which allotted individual farm plots to individual
I n d i a n ~ . 'The
~ ~ allotment process at Fort Berthold, however, began as an earlier experiment. In
P

1882, twenty families moved from their village to the other side of the Missouri to f m as

individuals.'" Although there was probably some support among the Three Tribes, the Indian
Agent Abram J. Gifford told them that if they did not farm individual plots in 1885, that he
would deny all government assistance.'28 The federal government finished the allotment of the
Three Tribes between 1895 and 1929 and all "surplus lands" were ceded to the federal

government for eventual sale to n ~ n - l n d i a n s . ' ~ ~
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Not all members of the Three Affiliated Tribes embraced allotment. In 1869, Chief Crow
Flies High separated from the Three Tribes with 185 Mandans and ~ i d a t s a s . ' ~He
' separated
because of a disagreement with the other chiefs. His band, the Xxoshgaas, went to live at Fort
Buford, Montana. In 1884, the federal government ordered them to return to Fort Berthold.
They did, but they did not agree with the policy of farming individual allotments."'
One of the purposes of allotment was to end the social organization of the Tribes. The

Three Tribes, however, established allotment communities such as "Lucky Mound, Elbowoods,
Independence, Armstrong, and Shell

The federal govemment unwittingly aided the

Indians by estabtishing schools within these districts. The tribal communities ~trengthened.'~~

Both the War Department and later the Department of the Interior used Army Officers as
Indian Agents. The Indian Agents used Indian people to help them. In 1895, Agent William H.
Clapp appointed Goodbird as a government farmer.134Goodbird was torn between loyalties to

r'

his family, clan, tribe, and the federal

The Agent ordered him to assign ten acres

to each man and to make sure each tilled it. "Goodbird's orders showed how the agent's role had
changed since the 1870s. hstead of being an ambassador to the tribe, the agent was now more

like a benign feudal lord tylng to guide the Indians to civilization and citizenship."'36
Additionally, the Indian Agent needed police to help run the federal agenda on the
~eservation.'~'However, "the U.S. government did not acknowledge the power of the Black
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Mouths, and the Black Mouths' ancient customs did not include enforcing laws made by white
legislatures.r r

138

Accordingly, the "Office of Indian Affairs made the laws, the agent was chief

of police, and Indian officers made up the police force."'39 The Fort Berthold Indian Police were
organized like a military with military ranks and

In 1918, the Indian Agent

assigned a private for each district in the ~eservation.'~'Even the buttons on the police uniforms
worn by the Indian police, were adorned with civilization phrases such as, "God Helps Those
Who Help ~hemselves."'~~
The Hidatsa Indian, Wolf Chief, reflected on the dual police systems
stating he knew that the Indian police would compete with the "traditional systems of
authority."143
During the 1920's the communities stabilized and the crops were good. But by the late
1920's and 1930's the Tribes suffered from "low prices and severe drought."'"

The Three

Tribes "were in a definite state of decline and people were living in harsh poverty. It was clear
that the federal policies of individual land ownership, education, and Christianization had failed,
and that the Indians, like other Americans, had not escaped the devastation of the Great
~ e ~ r e s s i o n . "The
' ~ ~Indians would next face a New Deal policy presented by the federal
government, the Indian Reorganization A C ~ . ' ~ ~

be used and that they be outfitted as soldiers because it would save U.S.lives and property and begin to civilize the
Indian).
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Indian Reorganization Act Constitutional Debate
Afier allotment and the Depression, it was clear to federal policy makers and to the Three
Affiliated Tribes, that they were better off using Indian governments and making their own tribal
decisions. Accordingly, in response to public outcry about the conditions on Indian
Reservations, the Indian Reorganization Act was passed. '47 Reformers were particularly
concerned about "white-controlled land tenure patterns, growing poverty, and administrative
abuse in Indian country."i48

John Collier, Commissioner of Indian Affairs, prepared a bill that became the Indian
Reorganization

Tribes were given the option of deciding whether to reorganize under a

constit~tion."~John Fredericks, an MHA Elder, recalled the three leaders active in promoting
the TAT IRA Constitution:
They were Peter Beauchamp who represented the Arikara, Fred Huber who
represented the Hidatsa and Arthur Mandan who represented the Mandans. They
were sent to Washington, D.C. by our hdian people who worked hard at raising
money for their expenses by basket socials and other donations. Otherwise, these
leaders of the Tribe were not paid any money for their service^.'^'
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The Three Tribes held meetings and conducted "serious and sustained debate" to
1
0
'

determine whether to organize under an Indian Reorganization con~titution.'~~
The people that
supported organization included the educated people, the businessmen, the ranchers, and some
traditionalists. The educated people wanted a means to formally express them~e1ves.l~~
The
businessmen and ranchers could see the business value of a formal

The

traditionalists wanted to see the younger generations "assume governmental responsibilities like
those which their ancestors had enjoyed."155Others liked the religious freedom provisions of the
A C ~ .The
' ~ conservatives
~
opposed the Act. They opposed a government offered by
untrustworthy white men that required approval by the Secretary of the Znterior. To them the

IRA government was not true self-government.'5'
An election was held, and the Tribes narrowly voted to accept organization by a vote of

366 for and 220 against.lS8 The Tribes also had debate about whether to organize under a

P\,

business charter.159They voted to incorporate under a charter which was approved by the
Secretary of the Interior on April 24, 1937.
Early IRA Government (1936-1954)

The Three Affiliated Tribes "made much progress toward organizing and estabIishing
itself' prior to World War II.l6'

During the 1930s and 1940s the Reservation was still isolated

fiom the outside world. The tribal economy was agricultural. The community raised horses,

CASH& WOLFF,supra note 98, at 73.
Id. at 73-74.
I54
Id. at 74.
ISS Id.
IS6 Id.
IS7 Id.
158
See T.A.T. CONST.CERTIFICATION
OF ADOPTION.
15' CASH& WOLFF,supra note 98 at 76.
Id.
Is*

153

cattle, and maintained gardens.'6' The Tribal Council received little or no compensation. The

-,.
Live Stock Association administered the economic and business of the members.162The Bureau
of Indian Affairs (BIA) "managed, with a heavy hand, services such as education, health, judicial
and trust

service^."'^^

Tribal tradition governed social intera~ti0n.l~~

The TAT EL4 Constitution worked well during the 1930s and 1940s because there was a
separation of powers; there was an appropriate balance of powers between the federal and tribal
government for that period. Power was held in four main areas: (1) the Tribal Council, (2) the
Fort Berthold Cattlemen's Association which was managed "by a Board of Directors and a Farm
Agent employed by the Bureau of Indian Affairs hired for assisting the board and its members,'65

(3) the BL4, and (4) the Tribal clans. John Fredericks stated,
Thus [during the 1930s and 1940~1the people of Fort Berthold made their living
off of the land and natural resources of our Reservation. More importantly this is
the period when we did not have any welfare or unemployment. We were doing
what we loved best, making a livelihood out of what the Federal government
directed our way - that of using our land and resources available to us and making
it work. Think about it, this had to be a period of time when our Indian people
enjoyed the fruits of life and liberty fiom their planning and initiative in the work
force. Also, when you take a real serious look at this period of time, we realize
that we had a separation of powers. The Tribal Council handled the government,
the [Fort Berthold Cattlemen's] Association handled the business affairs arid the
legal department was handled by the Bureau of Indian ~ f f a i r s . ' ~ ~

By the end of World War 11, the Tribes had a good economy on the Reservation. They
had springs and creeks for water, exposed coal for fuel, building materials, and winter cover for
livestock, wild berries and fruits for diet.16' The Tribe enjoyed a good period of success using
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However, the Tribe would soon face another

the Indian Reorganization Act

i"
devastating policy of the federal government, the Missouri River Basin Project.

The Garrison Dam
The Pick Sloan Act authorized the federal government to flood "over 550 square miles of
tribal land in North and South Dakota.. ..,3169 This Act authorized the Corps of Engineers to set
up 107 dams on the Missouri River

as in.'^'

The goals "of the project were flood control,

irrigation, and hydroelectric power."'71 The Bureau of Indian Affairs did not inform the Tribes
of the Missouri River Basin Development program until 1947, three years after it had been
passed through

Vine Deloria, Jr. described the Pick Sloan Act as "'the single most

destructive act ever perpetrated on any tribe by the United States.3 r 3 1 7 3 The Three Affiliated
Tribes fought the construction of Garrison Dam in Congress and in the courts.174 Unfortunately,
however, the Tribe lost the battle.
P,

The destruction caused by the creation of the Dam was as great as the two smallpox
epidemics.'7s The Dam flooded 25% of the bottomlands of the Reservation. Ninety percent of
the People lived in the bottomlands before the Dam and were forced to move to the highlands.'76

Forced relocation is always traumatic, even for an individual or a family. When it
is done to 90 percent of a people, the effects are awesome. All organizational
forms and structures were drastically altered; friendships were ripped apart;
community cohesion was totally dissolved; and the habits and customs of
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generations were almost complete1 destroyed. All of these elements now had to
be rebuilt practically from scratch.1%
The People were divided into new isolated communities because of the lack of roads and
bridges.'78 The Dam also destroyed the economic success that the People had built prior to the
end of World War D."' The People now had to move to a cash economy.'80 "About this time
the people felt that they would be better served by one councilman from each of the ...segments
with the chairman of the Tribe .. . voted in at large," instead of the previous system where each
segment had two representatives and the representatives elected the chairman.18'

Self-Determination Era

In the mid 1970's, the federal government passed the Self-Determination Act and the
balance of power shifted back into the hands of tribal government.182The Act authorized the
Tribe to take over control of federal BLA programs. As the M A Elders have explained, the Act
.A,

shifted federal administration of tribal assets back to the Tribe without adequate consideration of
whether the JRA government could manage such functions. The MHA Elders have stated, the
Act "expanded the authority of our tribal government to manage our affairs and access to
millions of tribal and federal dollars with less tribal government representation and no checks
and balances in place."183
Although Self-Determination is a good policy, very little consideration went into whether
the tribal form of government provided by the BIA,was adequately equipped to handle such

Id.
Id, at 84.
179 Id.
Id. The people were paid for the loss of the bottomlands but the money went to individual Inrllans and was and is
often spent unwisely. Id. at 84-86.
181
John Fredericks, Statement to the Tribal Council for Elders Organization 2 (May 4,2000) in Mandan, Hidatsa
and Arikara Newsletter, vol. 2000, No. 1.
182
25 U.S.C. 4450, et seq.
Mandan, Hidatsa, and Arikara Elders Organization, Position Paper 3 (2000).
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administration. Moreover, this discussion makes clear how little control the Tribe possesses over
,-i

federal policy and the direct relationship of that federal policy to internal tribal government. The
next sections deal with these tensions and the current balance of internal governmental powers.

V.

THEBALANCE
OF POWERS
BETWEEN
THE TRIBAL
COUNCIL
AND THE TRIBAL

This section addresses whether the Three Affiliated Tribes should amend its Constitution
to create a separate independent judiciary. The purpose of this section is to define the structure
of the Fort Berthold Court and to delineate the present separation of powers between the Tribal
Business Council and the Fort Berthold ~ 0 u r t . l ~ ~

Form of Government
The current government of the Three Affiliated Tribes is an Indian Reorganization Act

form of govenunent, which has changed little since 1936. The Three Affiliated Tribes

r',

Constitution states that the "governing body of the Three Affiliated Tribes of the Fort Berthold
~ ~ Three Affiliated Tribes
Reservation shall be known as the Tribal Business ~ o u n c i l . " 'The
Constitution provides:
The people of the Fort Berthold Reservation hereby grant to the Tribal Business
Council of the Three Affiliated Tribes all necessary sovereign authority legislative and judicial - for the purpose of exercising the jurisdiction granted by
the People in Article I of this Constitution. Further, the People hereby authorize
the Tribal Business Council to delegate to the Tribal Court such judicial power
and authority as may be necessary to realize the jurisdiction granted by the
People in Article I of this Constitution.

'"

./-'

The research in the next three sections consists of samples of Fort Berthold Tribal Cow? and Northern Plains
Interhibal Court of Appeals decisions from 1990 through 2000 as printed in the Indian Law Reporter. Judges
submit their opinions to the Indian Law Reporter; accordingly the samples may not be random. Telephone
Interview with Diane Johnson, Former Practicing Attorney & Judge Fort Berthold Tribal Court (Dec. 2000).
However, I also talked with two former Fort Berthold Judges about these cases. I also went to the Tribal Court and
was told that constitutional cases are rare and that I probably had the main cases.
T.A.T. CONST.art. 111, 5 1.
T.A.T. CONST. art VI, $ 3 (emphasis added).

<-

The Constitution vests all governing power, including both legislative and judicial power, in the
Tribal Business Council. The Council may, however, delegate "such judicial power and
authority as may be necessary to realize the jurisdiction granted by the People in Article I" of the
Constitution to the Tribal ~ 0 ~ r t .Article
l ~ ' I is a broad grant ofjurisdiction to the Tribe covering
"all persons and all lands, including lands held in fee, within the exterior boundaries of the Fort
Berthold ~eservation.""~
The Tribal Business Council has chosen to delegate all judicial power to the Tribal

Judiciary by statute.'89 The statute provides that 'The judicial power of the people of the Three
Affiliated Tribes shall be vested in the Fort Berthold judiciary and shall extend to all cases and
7,

controversies in law, equity and custom arising under the laws of the Three Af'filiated Tribes.

190

The Code provides that "It is the intent of this Code that the jurisdictional powers be liberally
conslrued to serve the ends of justice, and a failure to legislate in a particular area shal.1not be
,
.
I

deemed a waiver of that a~thority."'~'Therefore, the Code makes certain that the delegation of

Ig7 Id.

The full text of art. I provides:

lB8

The jurisdiction of the Three Affiliated Tribes of the Fort Berthold Reservation shall extend to all
persons and all lands, including lands held in fee, within the exterior boundaries of the Fort
BerthoId Reservation as defmed by the Act of March 3, 1891, (26 Stat. 1032) to all, lands added to
the Fort Berthold Reservation by Executive Order of June 17, 1892; and to such other persons and
lands as may hereafter come within the jurisdiction of the Three Affiliated Tribes, except as
otherwise provided by law.

T.A.T. CONST.art. I. Article I was amended by Amendment No. VIII, approved by the Secretary of the Interior's
delegate on March 11, 1985. The prior Article I approved June 29, 1936 provided that the jurisdiction of the Three
Affiliated Tribes would be limited "to Indian Trust and Tribal lands" within the Fort Berthold Reservation.
lag See In Tbe Matter of the Guardianship and Conservatorship of William Bell, Sr., 24 Indian L. Rep. 6105,6106
(Ft. Bert. Tr. Ct. 1997) citing Chapter 1, 92.1. Code of Laws of the Three AffiIiated Tribes.
See id.

Fredericks v. Continental Western Insurance Co., 20 Indian L. Rep. 6009,6010 (N. Plns. Intertr. Ct. App. 1992).
(emphasis in opinion) (citation omitted).
19'

,

power to the Court is nearly absolute.'92 See Figure 2. Federal law, however, limits the
,P,.

jurisdiction of the Court particularly over non-Indians on non-Indian fee land.lg3

192

n

Id.

'" See generally Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438 (1997); Montana v. United States, 450 U.S.544 (1981);

Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S.191 (1978).

People
Delegated Power to Council
through Constitution.

Tribal Council
Possesses hi1 Judicial Authority but delegated judicial power to the Tribal
Court and the Northern Plains Intertribal Court of Appeals.

.........................

May also strip jurisdiction fkorn the courts or hear appeals from either court if
it ever chooses to do so.

-

-k
7

Fort Berthold Tribal Court
Possesses a full delegation of
judicial power as long as Council
does not act to remove it.

Northern PLains Intertribal
Court of Appeals
May hear any appeal fi-om Tribal
Court as long as Council does not
act to remove it.

Structure of the Fort Berthold

The Council, as the legislative body, is empowered to redraft statutes that the Court has
misconstrued or redraft statutes when it appears that the old statute was i n e f f e ~ t i v e . 'Tribal
~~

members also use Council meetings to air grievances and to express dissatisfaction with Tribal
Court opinions.

95

Thus, the Three Affiliated Tribes IRA government vests all power in the Council. The
Council granted all judicial power to the Tribal Judiciary. Accordingly, the Tribal Court and the
194

See e.g.,Three Affiliated Tribes v. Howling Wolf, 27 Indian L. Rep. 6085, 6085 (N. Plns. Intertr. Ct. App. 2000)
(noting that the Three Afiliated Tribes Code was amended to allow peremptory challenges for judges in addition to

challenges for cause).
195
Telephone Interview with Diane Johnson, Former Practicing Attorney & Judge Fort Berthold Tribal Court (Dec.
2000); Hall v. Tribal Business Council, 23 Indian L. Rep. 6039, 6042 (Ft. Bert. Tr. Ct. 1996) (In this case, Austin
Gillette argued that a traditional remedy under due process is that an aggrieved party should place himself on the
agenda of the next Tribal Council Meeting).

r,

Northern Plains Intertribal Court of Appeals' existence depends upon the Council or on the
reliance of the People to protect the Courts.

Tribal Court
The Tribal Judiciary consists of two courts: the Fort Berthold Tribal Court and the
Northern Plains Intertribal Court of Appeals. The Tribal Court is a modem court and not a
traditional court. The Court uses formal procedures and is modeled after a state court.196The
Court may have any number ofjudges at one tirne.I9' Members, Indians, and non-hdians are
eligible to serve as judges.I9* The Judge usually conducts bench trials; however, juries may be
used, although this is rare.lg9 Only a licensed attorney or a licensed advocate may appear on
behalf of another person.200A party may appear pro se. The attorneys are subject to a Tribal
. ~ ~Court
~
disciplinary code.201The Court uses the Federal Rules of Civil ~ r o c e d u r e The
construes pleadings liberally and may consider matters outside the pleadings.203However, the
n,

Court may dismiss a claim sua ~ ~ o n t e . ~ ~ ~

The Tribal Judiciary holds membership in an Intertribal appellate court, the Northern
Plains Intertribal Court of Appeals. This Court is treated exactly as it were solely a Fort Berthold

1%

P

Telephone Interview with Diane Johnson, Former Practicing Attorney & Fort Berthold Tribal Court Judge (Dec.
2000).
lg7 Id.
lg8 Id.
199 Id.
200
See generally First Bank v. Knight, 24 Indian L. Rep. 6156,6156 (Ft. Bert. Tr. Ct. 1997) (citation omitted).
20 1
See Matter of Attorney License of William E. Woods, Jr., 25 Indian L. Rep. 6034, 6035 n. 2 (Ft. Bert. Tr. Ct.
1997).
202
Telephone Interview with Diane Johnson, Former Practicing Attorney & Judge Fort Berthold Tribal Court (Dec.
2000). See e.g.,Hall v. Lakeside State Bank of New Town, 26 Indian L. Rep. 6032,6032 (Ft. Bert. Tr. Ct. 1998)
(allowing consolidation of hearings when cases involve similar issues); Gwin v. Bohan, 25 lndian L. Rep. 6121,
6122 (Ft. Bert. Tr. Ct. 1998) (outlining requirements for an injunction); Bordeaux v. Wilkinson, 21 Indian L. Rep.
613 1,6131-6132 (Ft. Bert. Tr.Ct. 1993) (allowing a party to raise the defense of failure to state a claim).
203
See generally White Horse v. 4 Bears Casino & Lodge, 25 Indian L. Rep. 6079,6080 (Ft. Bert. Tr. Ct. 1997).
Good Iron v. Hall, 26 Indian L. Rep. 6029,6030 (Ft. Bert. Tr. Ct. 1998).

Tribal Appellate Court. It has the right to review the lower Tribal Court and to reverse incorrect
P\

decisions.205It also has the power to make critical decisions about tribal law.206

Separation of Powers Between the Council and the Judiciary
Although the Constitution does not provide for constitutional separation of powers, the
Council has provided for statutory separation of powers through a resolution passed in the 1980s,
which states that the Council will not interfere with the Tribal ~udiciar~.~''

Not only this Tribe but also many tribes "have moved to a policy of de facto, if not de
jure, separation of powers."208 Although statutory separation of powers is the easiest way to
facilitate separation of powers, a leading Tribal Constitutional Scholar, Frank Pommersheim,
recommends that "more detailed and thoughtful approaches are needed to meet the persistent,
long-term need for legitimacy.. .of the tribal judiciary."20g In fact, this short term approach may
already have its flaws at Fort Berthold; the Council has in one very rare instance passed a
7.

resolution that removed jurisdiction from the
The Constitution could, however, be amended to provide for a separate constitutional
Judiciary. Many tribes are now amending their constitutions to provide for constitutional
separation of powers. For example, the Cheyenne River Sioux of South Dakota recently

205

See Indian Credit Corp. v. Gillette, 18 Indian L. Rep. 6001, 6002 (N. Plns. Intertr. Ct. App. 1990) (holding that
the Tribal Court erred in making a choice of law decision).
200
See Francis v. Wilbson, 20 Indian L. Rep. 6015, 6015 (N. Plns.Inre&. Ct.App. 1993) (holding that Art. VI,
53(b) waives the sovereign immunity of the Tribe for ICRA claims); See also Fettig v. Danks, 18 Indian L. Rep.
6057,6057-6058 (N. Phs.Intertr. Ct. App. 1990) (affirming the lower court decision's that the defendant was
negligent but also adopting a new rule of law unnecessary to the opinion. Such action demonstrates that the N. Plns.
Inter. Ct. App. is quite powerful).
lo7 Telephone Interview with Diane Johnson, Former Practicing Attorney & Judge Fort Berthold Tribal Court (Oct.

2000); Interview with Kip Quale, Three Afiliated Tribes Attorney, at Fort Berthold, ND (March 12,2001) (stating
he wrote the Resolution but he did not have a copy for me to cite).
POMMERSHEIM,
supru note 3, at 74 (footnote omitted).
=09 Id.
2'0 Good Iron v. Hall, 26 Indian L. Rep. 6029, 6030 (Ft. Bert.Tr. Ct. 1998) (citation omitted) (a majority of the
Tribal Business Council passed Resolution No. 98-010 which removed the case of Good Iron v. Hall from the
Court's jurisdiction to avoid relitigating issues in two previous cases).

amended its constitution to provide that "'Decisions of tribal courts may be appealed to tribal
,P\

appellate courts, but shall not be subject to review by the Tribal Council.,99211

Tn theory, however, there might be a simpler constitutional solution. The Court could
breathe life into the second constitutional provision that mentions the Court, the Indian Civil

Rights Act (ICRA) provision, to fmd a textual hook for constitutionally based court
Art. W, $3(b) provides that:

The People.. .hereby specifically grant to the Tribal Court the authority to enforce
the provisions of the Indian Civil Rights Act, 25 U.S.C. 1301 at seq., including
the award of injunctive relief only against the Tribal Business Council if it is
determined through an adjudication that the Tribal Business Council has in a
specific instance violated that
The Court, however, has apparently not interpreted §3(b) broadly. Instead, the Court has
interpreted this provision only as a waiver of sovereign immunity so that the People can sue the
r\

Council but the remedy is limited to injunctive relief.

A former judge for the Tribal Court has

stated that the only function of 93(b) is to give effect to the Indian Civil Rights Act, no more, no
less.215It is as if the provision reads "The People . . . hereby specifically waive the sovereign
immunity of the Tribal Council."
It is significant that the Court or advocates have not used this provision to broaden the
powers of the Court. The language clearly could be read to achieve more than one purpose: (1)
a specific grant to the Tribal Court of authority to enforce the provisions of the Indian Civil
Rights Act, as well as (2) the necessary waiver of sovereign immunity. This reading would give

POMMERSHEIM,supra note 3, at 74 n. 72 (1997) citing CHEYENNE
RIVERSIOUXTRIBALCONST.art. IV,3 l(k)
(19921.
i'2 SC; T.A.T. CONST.art. VI, $3(b).
id. (emphasis in original). Section 3(b) was amended by Amendment No. VIII, effective March 11, 1985.
214
Francis v. Wilkinson, 20 Indian L. Rep. 60 15,60 15 (N.Plns. Intertr. Ct. App. 1993).
215
Telephone Interview with Diane Johnson, Formex Practicing Attorney & Judge Fort Berthold Tribal Court (Dec.
2''

2000) (clarifying that this is a limited waiver of sovereign immunity to make the provisions of the ICRA functional
but nothing further).

effect to every word of the Constitution. In other words, if the provision were read only as a
P.

waiver of sovereign immunity then the language "The People.. .hereby specifically grant to the
Tribal Court the authority to enforce the provisions of the Indian Civil Rights Act.. .," would be
superfluous. Therefore, to give meaning to the entire constitutional provision, the Court should
read the provision as authorizing jurisdiction over ICRA claims.
Accordingly, the broadest construction of Art. VI, $3(b) grants the Court inherent

constitutionalauthority to construe and enforce the Indian Civil Rights Act. The Court would be
the sole arbiter of the hdian Civil Rights Act and the Council could never take away jurisdiction
over the Indian Civil Rights Act because to do so would violate constitutionally mandated
separation of powers. See Figure 3.
However, as a practical matter the Council would probably not take away criminal and
civil jurisdiction fiom the Court because it would then have to conduct judicial matters in
-(,

addition to its other workm216

2'6

Interview with Vance Gillette, Former Chief Judge Fort Berthold Tribal Court, at Fort Berthold, ND (March 15,

2001).
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People
Delegated Power to Council and Court through Constitution.

-

-.

>

-

J

Tribal Council

Constitutional Court

Possesses partial Judicial Authority.
Deleguted judicial power to the Tribal Court and
the Northern Plains Intertribal Court of Appeals.
No need to delegate authority to hear ICRA
cases.

Constitutional Jurisdicfion to hear
hdian Civil ~ i ~~~t
h Cases.
t ~ Council
may not abolish or overturn court's
decisions on Indian Civil Rights Act
Cases.

-------------------

May strip courts of power or hear appeals except
for ICRA cases.

Fort Berthold Tribal Court
Possesses a full delegation of
judicial power as long as Council
does not act to remove it.

V

b

Northern Plains Intertribal
Court of Apaeals
May hear any appeal from Tribal Court as
long as Council does not act to remove
appellate jurisdiction. Council may not
remove appellate jurisdiction over ICRA
Cases.

Figure 3
Structure of the Fort Berthold Court System when the specific grant of power to hear ICRA
cases in Art. VI,53(b) is construed as more than a waiver of sovereign immunity.

It should be noted that in at least one case the Court has construed 53(b) broadly as a
constitutional grant of authority. In Hall v. Lakeside State Bank of New Town,the Court held
that the newly elected Chairman could vote twice on his successor to the Mandaree Segment.
Chairman Hall was the first Chairman to be elected from the position of a sitting Councilman
and the question of how to fill his former seat raised several constitutional and election issues for

the Tribe and the

In the wake of the election, the newly constituted Council passed

Resolution 98-010, which removed the case of Good Iron v. Hall from the Court to avoid

,r'
2'7

Hall v. Lakeside State Bank of New Town, 26 Indian L. Rep. 6032,6032-6036 (Ft.Bert. Tr.Ct. 1998).

relitigating issues previously decided in Hall v. Lakeside State Bank of New

own.^'^

The Court

;--,

held that regardless of the Resolution, it would still have jurisdiction to hear valid claims under
the Indian Civil Rights ~ c t . ~The
" Court wrote:
The only specific grant of authority to the tribal court in the Constitution comes
by virtue of Art. VI. 5 3(b) under which the people confer jurisdiction on the court
to 'enforce the provisions of the Indian Civil Rights Act.. .' Thus, this Court must
comply with the directive of Resolution No. 98-010 P H unless the complaint
sufficiently states a basis for an Indian Civil Rights Act violation.220
The Court construed §3(b) broadly as jurisdictional authority over ICRA claims. However, the
Court found that the complaint did not state a claim under the ICRA and did in fact attempt to
relitigate issues previously decided in Half v. Lakeside State Bank ofNew Town, so the Court
dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and for failure to state a claim.22'
Former Chief Judge Vance Gillette, however, has questioned the precedential vahe of

' ~ Resolution No. 98-010 was passed without the necessary quorum to
r - , Good Iron v. ~ a 1 1 . ~First,
do business. Instead, it was passed by "a majority of the Tribal Business ~ o u n c i l . " ~ ~ ~
Accordingly, Resolution No. 98-010 may be invalid.224Second, there is also a question whether
there was a valid quorum to hire Judge B.J. Jones, the presiding judge in both Good Iron v. Hall
and Hall v. Lakeside State Bank of New

own.^^^

Finally, Vance Gillette argues that Good Iron

218

See Good Iron v. Hall, 26 Indian L. Rep. 6029, 6030 (Ft. Bert. Tr. Ct. 1998) citing Hall v. Lakeside State Bank of
New Town, 26 Indian L. Rep. 6032 (Ft. Bert. Tr. Ct. 1998).

Id.
Id. (citation omitted) (emphasis added) (opinion by Judge B.J. Jones).
Id. at 6030-6032.
222 Interview with Vance Gillette, Former Chief Judge Fort Berthold Tribal Court, at Fort Berthold, ND (March 15,
200 I).
2U Id.; Good Iron, at 6030.
224 Interview with Vance Gillette, Former Chief Judge Fort Berthold Tribal Court, at Fort Berthold, ND (March 15,
2001).
225
Id; C.5 Hall v. Lakeside State Bank of New Town, at 6032-6036, (where parties consented that Judge Jones had
authority to hear the matters in Hail v. Lakeside stating Judge Jones was appointed by the previous Tribal Business
Council [before the election dispute]. I am not sure what effect the holding that Chairman's double vote on his
successor does not violate the ICRA has on the arguments about whether a legal quorum was present to do
business).
'I9

220

has questionable value because no appeal could be taken from Good Iron. The Tribe had failed
to pay the annual fee for membership with the Northern Plains Intertribal Court of Appeals, and
the Tribe's membership lapsed.226
However, even if Good Iron has little precedential value, the Court has also indicated that
it has jurisdiction over ICRA cases in Bordeaux v.

Jn Bordeaux, the Court stated that

"section 3(b)) [sic] contains a specftc grant of authority from the people of the Three Affiliated
3,228
Tribes to the tribal court to enforce the provisions of the Jndian Civil Rights Act.. ..
However, it is less clear whether the Court considered its authority as constitutional jurisdiction
or mere authority.
Although the Court could construe this provision as constitutional authority to hear ICRA
claims, the People should evaluate whether it would be best to amend the Constitution. There
are several reasons why a constitutional amendment may be warranted. First, the People would
I ,,-

make the decision and not have to wait for the Court to construe Art. VI, §3(b) as a constitutiona1
grant of power over ICRA cases, which might never happen. Second, it might be better to have a
separate and independent judiciary for all claims, not only ICRA claims. For example, a leading
reason to have a separate and independent judiciary has been suggested by the Harvard Project
on Economic Development. These scholars and students reason that a separate and independent
judiciary should be available to hear disputes between tribes and the businesses that contract with
them. Such provision for an independent forum stimulates investment within hdian country
because investors are more willing to enter into tribal contracts when they know that the Council
which usually fashions the terms of the contract, will not also be construing the terms should a

Id.
227
228

See Bordeaux v. Wilkinson, 21 Indian
Id. at 6 133 (emphasis added).

L.Rep. 6131 (Ft. Bert. Tr. Ct. 1993).

,n

dispute arise.229 This statement is also true of Fort Berthold. Two Harvard students that chose to
study the economic circumstances at Fort Berthold opined that investors want "an impartial body
that will hear business-related disputes."230 On the other hand, the People should consider the
purpose of the Harvard students' statements: to open the Reservation to economic development.
Therefore, if the goal of the People is not economic development, then it may not be necessary to
separate the judiciary.
Third, the People should consider what control, if any, they want the Council to retain
over the Court's jurisdiction. This question is especially difficult; it goes to whether the Council
should be able to "check" the power of the Court by defining or limiting its jurisdiction.

In conclusion, the Tribal Council is the supreme law of the land for the Three Affiliated
Tribes. The Court system exists at the sufferance of the Tribal Council. However, there is
statutory separation of powers and this division of powers may be an adequate balance of powers

n
because the Court has created enormous power for itself. However, there could be constitutional
separation of powers. First, the Court could formalize its interpretation of Art. VI, §3(b) to
authorize constitutionaljurisdiction over Indian Civil Rights Claims, thereby precluding the
Council from ever dissolving the Court at least for the purpose of Indian Civil Rights Claims.
Alternatively, the People could adopt an amendment to the Constitution granting the Tribal Court
independent authority for all disputes. The People should also consider what checks the Council
should retain, if any, over the Court's jurisdiction.

w.

BALANCE
OF POWERS
BETWEEN
THE LEGISLATIVE
AND EXECUTIVE
FUNCTIONS

This section examines whether there should be a separate constitutionally created
executive branch of government. The Constitution does not mention the word "executive."
229

P.

See gener~ally,Overview, Harvard Project on Economic Development, www.ha~ard.edu/h~aieNoverview.
='Sue W. Wong & Annando L.Ramirez, A New Direction: Building a Foundation for Successful Economic
Development on The Three Afiliafed Tribes' Fort Berthold Reservation (Executive Summary) (1996).

,n,

However, it is common knowledge that the Council exercises executive as well as legislative

power. The Council's exercise of executive power materializes in two ways. First, most tribal
members look to the Chairman for oversight of the executive businesses and departments.
Second, the Constitution delegates powers to the Council that are executive in nature.
As discussed in the previous section, the Council holds all governing power.23' Besides
granting all general legislative power to the Council, the Constitution also grants specific powers
to the Tribal Business

The Council has the power to define

The

Council has the power to create the budget, to tax, and to expend funds as long as its actions are
made a matter of public record.234The Council regulates hunting, fishing, inheritance, and
cultural traditions and arts.235The Council also has the power to advise the Secretary of the
Interior or the Superintendent as to tribal affairs or pending federal actions and pending federal
appointments.236It has the power to appoint officers and committees and it has the power to
P

regulate their procedure.237The Council also holds the impeachment power. It has the power to
remove one of its members for cause.238

In addition, the Council exercises executive powers. It has the power to administer the
government and its business ventures:39 the power to hire and fire all tribal employees,240and it

a'T.A.T. CONST.art. 111, 9 1; art. VI, § 3.
232
See generally T.A.T. CONST.art. 11,111, VI, and IX.
233
T.A.T. CONST.
Art. 111, $3. This power to define membership is one of the few that is not subject to the laws of
the United States. See Santa CIara v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49,52 (1978). All other powers of the Council are subject
to the statutes of the United States. T.A.T. CONST.art. VI, 5 2. Additionally, all powers of the Council are subject
to ( 1 ) popular referendum by the people and (2) internal constraints within the Three Affiliated Tribe's Constitution
and Bylaws. T.A.T. CONST.art VI, §$ 1-2.
a4T.A.T. CONST.art. VI, 5 5(b), (c).
235 T.A.T. CONST.
art. VI, § S(h), Cj).
236 See T.A.T.CONST.
art. VI, $ 5(f), (k).
237
T.A.T. CONST.
art. 111, 5 5; art. VI, 5 5(1).
238
T.A.T. CONST.art. V, $ 2 .
239 T.A.T. CONST.
art. VI, 5 5(a).
240T.A.T.CONST.art. 111, 9 5 ; art. VI, 5(c), (1).

also possesses the prosecution power.24' Often, the exercise of these powers is the most
7
.
.

controversial.
First, the Council controls tribal lands and all economic affairs and enterprises.242The
Tribal Council also manages the IRA Corporate

Therefore, the Council exercises

both the lawmaking power and the administration power over the Tribe's two most valuable
assets: land and economic enterprises.
Leading Tribal Constitutional Scholar Frank Pommersheim has stated: many tribes fail
to properly distinguish between governmental and proprietary functions.244Thls causes
inappropriate action by legslators, when for example, they might "terminate a particular project
without understanding that the business venture is proprietary and must be regdated
independently of direct control by the governing body."245 For this reason, tribes need to educate

I

-'.

themselves on the role of government and may need "a more exacting use and understanding" of
their tribal IRA constitutions and federal charters.246
To improve the Three Affiliated Tribes' economy, the Three Tribes requested the
assistance of Harvard specialists in tribal economic development. The Harvard Project on
Economic Development has also found that stronger tribal institutions improve a tribe's chances
for economic success. Among their findings is that tribes should separate "the functions of
elected representation and business management."247 They suggest there should be a separate
office from the Council that handles economic planning. The two Harvard students that prepared
the economic analysis for Fort Berthold noted that the centralization of power in the Council

"' T.A.T. CONST.art. VI, f 3(a).

T.A.T. CONST.art. VI, 5 5(a); art. LX.
See T.A.T. CORPORATE
CHARTER
$4 MANAGEMENT (1934).
244 POMMERSHEIM,
SUPM note 3, at 170.
245 Id.
246 Id. at 171.
241
See Overview, Harvard Project on American Indian Economic Development, ~vww.harvard.edu/h~aied/overview.
242
243
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"can create incentives for opportunist behavior."248 It can also discourage investment fiom
f--

..,

outside parties and tribal
Accordingly, the Three Affiliated Tribes should seriously consider moving the
administration of the business into the hands of another independent branch. Perhaps, an easy
transition would be to allow the Chairman to conduct these affairs without the Council. This
could be accomplished through a small change such as separating the administration of the
businesses through economic departments with less control by the Council. Alternatively, the
People could amend the Constitution to create a separate executive branch. As discussed above,
however, the Tribe should only consider the suggestions of Pommersheim and the Harvard
students if a major goal of the Tribe is economic development and investment by outsiders.
However, if the People believe there is value in separating the executive and legislative
branches, there should be a discourse on how this will affect the Council's current power which
allows it to represent the Tribe and to advise the Secretary of the Interior and the federal
government. Care should be taken to avoid the appearance that there are two representatives of
the Tribe, i.e., the problems of having both the Council and the Chairman deal with the federal
government.250
Second, the Council holds the prosecution power.251The Council appoints and hires the
prosecutors; in turn,the prosecutors decide whom to prosecute. This has caused some problems
in the past. For example, in Matter of Consolidated Criminal Cases, the Public Defender moved
to dismiss ten pending cases against criminal defendants on the grounds of equal protection and

248

Sue W. Wong & Armando L. Ramirez, A New Direction: Building a Founhzionfor Success~ulEconomic
Development on The Three Afilialed Tribes ' Fort Berthold Reservation (Executive Summary)(1996).
249 Id.
250 Discussion with P.S. Deloria, Director of American Indian Law Center, in Albuq., NM (March 2000).
T.A.T. CONSTart. m, g j(a).

due process.252The Public Defender argued that due to the failure to prosecute Councilman
-\
'

1

'

Mark Fox, it was unfair to prosecute the other

defendant^.^'^

Mark Fox had been charged with

assault but actively used his position as Councilman to avoid hiring a special prosecutor for his
case.254The Prosecutor assigned to Mark Fox's case, El Marie Conklin, was transferred to the
Tax Department. The acting Prosecutor requested that the Council hire another Prosecutor
Councilman Mark Fox assigned the task to the Judiciary Committee of which he was a member,
~ ~ Court
~
agreed with the Public Defender that the
and the appointment died in ~ o r n r n i t t e e .The
rights of the defendants were violated because they could not hide behind a public office as
Councilman Fox did to avoid prosecution. Accordingly, the Court dismissed the cases.256
There should be some debate as to whether moving the prosecution power to the
executive branch would be the best remedy. As the above case suggests, the Court was able to
address this situation through its interpretation of the ICRA. Moreover, this same problem could

p
arise in the executive branch if and when an executive branch is created.
Third, the Tribal Council hires and fires all tribal employees.257It also controls the
salaries of tribal officials and employees as long as it is a matter of public record.258 Frank
Pomrnersheim has also addressed this matter. He states that when tribes conduct economic
development they run into a classic problem: "political considerations in hiring, maximizing
employment opportunities, and dealing with the inadequate segregation of governmental and
proprietary f ~ n c t i o n s . "Among
~ ~ ~ the Fort Berthold People, the politicized hiring and firing is

252

Matter of Consolidated Criminal Cases, 25 Indian L. Rep. 6062, 6062-6063 (Ft. Bert. Tr. Ct. Nov. 1997).
Id.
254 Id. at 6063.
255 Id.
2S6
Id.; See also Matter of Consolidated Criminal Cases, 25 Indian L. Rep. 6062,6062 (Ft. Bert. TI.Ct. Oct. 1997)
(dismissing five earlier cases on the ground of equal protection).
"'T.A,T, CONST.art. 111.9 5; Art. VI, 5 S(1).
T.A.T. CONST.art. VI, § 5(c).
259 POMMERSHEIM,
supra note 3, at 170.
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the most commonly cited problem in the current govemment.260The members note that the
! r ' l

Tribe is the largest employer on the Reservation and yet there is little job security because of

tribal
To combat this problem, Pommersheim notes that some tribes "adopt hiring and selection
criteria that minimize nepotism" and tribal

The Three Affiliated Tribes has attempted

to implement a Civil Service. The Council commissioned the Constitutional Revision
Committee to conduct hearings and determine what amendments should be made to the
Constitution. The Constitutional Revision Committee recommended the establishment of a Civil
Service Commission for tribal employees.263

The recommendation of the Committee is interesting because it could be implemented
regardless of whether or not there is a separate and independent executive branch. In fact, the
problems inherent in political hiring and firing may not go directly to the form of government but

n,

to the absence of ethical standards for Councilmen or lack of hiring and firing criteria.
Moreover, the People should keep in mind that there are in general "people issues" that could
interfere with any system of government, no matter what the form. However, it is still usefbl to
examine the proposed Civil Service Commission.
The Commission, as proposed, would remove the power to hire and fire tribal employees
from the Tribal Council and grant it to a Civil Service Commission. The stated goal of the
proposed Civil Service Commission was to "ensure that, as far as practicable, the hiring,

260 The Special Committee for Constitutional Amendment Process, Interim Report 25-26 (May 5,1998) (community
meeting minutes and surveys); Discussion with MHA Elders, at Fort Berthold, ND (March 12,2001).
Interview with MHA Elder, at Fort Berthold, ND (March 15, 2001).
262 POMMERSHEIM,
supra note 3, at 170.
263 Resolution No. 98-82 (1998).

rx

promotion, retention and dismissal of tribal employees shall be done according to merit and
fitness standards" as developed and enforced by the ~ornrnission.~"

The proposal states that the Commission shall have five members.26s The Council shall
appoint two members; the Tribal employees shall appoint two members; and the four members
shall elect the fifth member. If the four members cannot reach a majority, the members shall

hold a drawing from two members that were originally proposed.266The Commission shall serve
four years and members shall be removed only for "'Good Cause.,99267

The Commission "shall establish a category of 'excepted employees' who may serve as
personal aides, advisors, or assistants to elected tribal officials" as long as this class is less than
ten percent of the workforce.268The excepted category represents political advisors and aides
that serve at the discretion of elected officials. Every other employee would survive changes in
administration. The Civil Service Amendment passed the Council by a vote of 4 for 2 against
n

and 0 not

Unfortunately, the Secretary of the Interior never called for the required

amendment election on this matter, and the Commission was never e~tablished.~'~

In conclusion, the People could amend the Constitution to provide for a separate
executive branch. Alternatively, the People could rely on other easily implemented methods to
separate the powers and alleviate the present problems in the system. In addition, whether or not
the People amend the Constitution to provide for a separate executive to control the prosecution
power, the People could rely on the Tribal Court to enforce ICRA rights thus making sure that

Id.
Id.
266 Id.
z67 Id.
Id.
269 Id.
264
265

id;Interview with F%yllis Old Dog Cross, Member of Constitutional Revision Committee, at Fort Berthold, ND
(March 14,2001).
270

Council Members do not misuse their power. The Court's enforcement of individual rights
P

under the ICRA is discussed in the next section.
MI.

BALANCE
OF POWERSBETWEEN
THE GOVERNMENT
AND THE PEOPLE

The previous two sections addressed the internal g o v e m e n t structure of the Three
Affiliated Tribes. That analysis involved classic separation of powers issues. This section
examines the relationship between the powers of the people and the powers of the IRA
government. This division of powers is not usually referred to as separation of powers. Ln light
of the People's extensive traditional involvement in government, however, this tern could also
be applied to the balance of powers between the government and the People.
The constitutional powers of the People include four rights: the right to amend the

the right to elect the members of the
con~titution;~~'
actions by the

the right to call a referendum on

and the right to practice civil rights as adopted by the Court through its

P

interpretation of the Indian Civil Rights A C ~ . ~ ~ ~
First, the People have the right to amend the Constitution by asking the Secretary of the
Interior to caIl a special amendment e~ection.~"The Secretary has the duty to call the election if
113 of the qualified voters present a signed petition.27"hirty

percent of those entitled to vote

must attend the election and cast a vote. A majority vote amends the
The Secretarial approval provision addresses the previous discussion of balancing federal
power with tribal power. This provision could be amended to omit the Secretary's involvement

in the Tribe's Constitution. However, this may be a good use of federal power because if the
27 1

T.A.T. CONST.art. X.
See generally, T.A.T. CONST.art. IV.
273 T.A.T. CONST.
art. VIII.
274 T.A.T. CONST.
art. VI, 3(b).
T.A.T. CONST.art. X.
276 Id. This provision also places a duty on the Secretary of the Interior to call an election if 2/3 of the Tribal
Council requests such an election.
272

*''

277

id.

n

Secretary does not call the election, another entity must do so, and because the likely entity is the
Council, the Council may be reluctant to call the election.278
Although the Amendment provision is clear, there is another provision mentioning the
right of the People to amend the Constitution. It provides that

Any rights and powers heretofore vested in the Three Affiliated Tribes of the Fort
Berthold Reservation, but not expressly referred to in this Constitution, shall not
be abridged by this Article, [the Powers of the Council] but may be exercised by
the people of the Fort Berthold Reservation through the adoption of appropriate
Bylaws and Constitutional amendment^?'^
Unlike the loLh
Amendment in the federal constitution, which states that powers not
delegated to the federal government are reserved to the states or to the people,280the tribal
provision is a mere truism. It does not add substantive value to the Constitution. It is not
effective to protect the civil rights of the People because it requires no more than the affirmative
action of the People through their existing right to amend the Constitution. This is not a true

r>

constraint on the Council.
Perhaps the People should amend this provision of the Constitution so that it does
constrain the Council. The provision could be rewritten to mirror the federal 10th Amendment.
As such it would restrict the Council's ability to legislate only as to its enumerated powers.
However, even the 1othAmendment might be labeled a mere truism. Lndeed, there is substantial
debate as to whether the lothAmendment adds any substance to the federal constitution or
whether it only confirms that the fderal government may only exercises its limited enumerated
powers.28'

278
279
280

28'

T.A.T. CONST.art. VIII.
T.A.T. CONST.art. VI, § 7.
U.S. CONST.amend. X.

FARBER,ESKRJDGE
& FNCKEY,SUPW note 30 at 766-768.

Alternatively, this provision could state that the Council only has the right to enact laws

n

affecting the health, safety, and welfare of tribal members. This revision could restrict the
Council's exercise of its enumerated powers by requiring that the exercise is tied to the health,
. ~ ' ~ the People could also amend the Bylaws to
safety, and welfase of the ~ e o ~ l e Perhaps
implement this protection.
Second, the People have the right to elect a segment representative to the TribaI Business
They also have the right to elect the

Remarkably, this right differs

from the federal and state right to vote because there is no "one person one vote" requirement as
in the federal model. In the surveys that the Constitutional Committee conducted, many tribal
members remarked on this difference.285Currently, the communities are not districted by
population and there may be a need for an additional segment.286During the Four Bears
Community Meeting, one person voiced concern about the influx of members moving fxom
P.

houses in the country into

In addition, many members have moved off the Reservation and are excluded fkom
voting. This matter, too, is highly debated within the membership. While the federal
government provides funding to the Tribe based on its total membership, many off-Reservation
members are disenfranchised. This question is quite complicated and should be addressed by the
entire tribaI membership.
Third, the People have the right to petition for a referendum election. If ten percent of
the qualified voters of each community sign a petition, the Council must call a referendum

282
283

C.5Resolution No. 98-8 1 (1998).
See generally T.A.T. CONST.art. IV.

284 r . ~
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The Special Committee for Constitutional Amendment Process, Interim Report 26 (May 5, 1998).
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Hall v. Lakeside State Bank ofNew Town, 26 Indian L. Rep. 6032, 6036 n. 16.
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election.288The majority vote of the qualified voters binds the Council as to any proposed or
enacted ordinance or resolution, provided that at least 30% of the eligible voters vote in such an
election.289
The referendum is a hotly debated provision of the Constitution. Apparently, there is no

provision in the Constitution or Bylaws to call a referendum election if the Council fails to call
the election after receiving a valid petition from the ~ e o ~There
~ ecould
. ~ be~at ~least three
methods to avoid this problem. This provision could be changed to mirror the amendment article
by requiring the Secretary of the lnterior to call the election.291This provision could also be
amended to incIude a no-action approval by the Council. If the Council does not act to call an
election by a certain date, the petition for referendum will be deemed passed. In fact, the
Constitutional Revision Committee proposed a new referendum article that would allow a noaction approval by the ~ o u n c i l . ~ "Alternatively, there could be a provision in the Constitution
r',

authorizing the Court to act when the Council fails to call the election or the Court might posses
a Mandamus power over the Council to compel it to call the election.
However, referendum provisions create negative effects too. For example, the People
could decide to take money out of governmental operations and mandate its use for other
purposes. Theoretically, this could hit the "purse" of the Tribal government and prevent finding
for its smooth operation. However, if the referendum provision is altered it could have a
provision restricting its use in monetary matters.

T.A.T. CONST.art. VIII.
Id.
Resolution NO.98-81 (1998).
See T.A.T. CONST.art. X.
292 Resoluriou No.98-81 (1998).
289

Indian Civil Rights Act

Finally, the People have the right to sue the Council for injunctive relief for rights in the
. ~People
~ ~ never included civil rights in the Constitution, nor did the
Indian Civil Rights A C ~ The

BIA suggest any similar provisions. Instead, federal policy changed and intervened to shift the
balance in favor of the People and non-Indians with the passage of the Indian Civil Rights ~ct.'"
Since its passage, the Tribal Court has implicitly recognized and executed the provisions of the
federal Indian Civil Rights Act, through its interpretation of the Constitution.
The federal Indian Civil Rights Act has also been highly debated. The first debate
surrounds whether Tribes should have been left alone to draft their own civil rights or have been
left free to continue without them. However, even though the Act has been passed, there is still

room for the Fort Berthold People to consider officially enacting each provision of the ICRA into
the Constitution or to draft their own individual rights provisions.
f-'

The second debate is whether the Act is self-executing or whether it requires the Council
or the People to adopt the Act and thereby make it a tribal law.295The third debate has been
whether the Act itself waives the sovereign immunity of the tribes in tribal

The final

debate is whether tribes should waive sovereign immunity and if so what remedies should be
provided to tribal members and n o n - ~ n d i a n s . ~ ~ ~
In a precedent setting decision, Francis v. Wilkinson, the Northern Plains Intertribal
Court of Appeals settIed some of the above ICRA debates with respect to the Three Affiliated

T.A.T. CONST.art. VI, 3 3(b); 25 U.S.C. 5 130 1 , et seq.
25 U.S.C. $1301, er seq.
295 Discussion with Christine Zuni Cruz, Professor of Law, University of New Mexico, in Albuq., NM (February
293
294

2001).

'"Vicki J. Lirnas, Employment Suits Against Indian Tribes: Balancing Sovereign Rights and Civil Rights, 359 Den.
U.L. Rev. vol. 70:2380-382.
297 Id. at 389-392.

~ r i b e s . ~It ~reversed
*
the Tribal Court and held that AJ%.VI, §(3)(b) of the Three Affiliated
P.

Tribes Constitution does contain an express waiver of sovereign immunity and therefore
implicitly held that the Tribe, through its waiver, had executed the law.299The Fort Berthold
Tribal Court had relied upon Santa Clara v. Mardinez which held that tribes enjoy sovereign
immunity unless there is a clear and unequivocal waiver by the tribe or congress.300 The
Appellate Court disagreed finding clear language. The language of $3(b)provides:
The People.. .hereby specifically grant to the Tribal Court the authority to enforce
the provisions of the Jndian Civil Rights Act.. .including the award of injunctive
relief only against the Tribal Business CounciI if it is determined through an
adjudication that the Tribal Business Council has in a specific instance violated
the ~ c t . ~ ' l

Furthermore, the Appeals Court majority held that the Tribal Court could hear a case
against the Tribal Council but that relief would be limited to an injunction.302 The dissenting
p

judge wrote that the Three Affiliated Tribes' attempt to limit the remedy against the Council
violated the Indian Civil Rights Act because the ICRA does not impose any limitations on
relief303 He reasoned that because federal law trumps tribal law and because the Three
Affiliated Tribe's Constitution Art. VI, 92 states that it is subject to federal law, "the type of
relief sought for and granted in any ICRA suit against the tribe should be consistent with the
substance of the Indian Civil Rights A C ~ . " ~ O ~ The dissent fhrther rationalized that under the
majority's holding, "it is possible for the tribe to confiscate and immediately liquidate the private
property of any person within their jurisdiction without providing an adequate remedy.

298 See Francis
299

v. Wilkinson, 20 Indian L. Rep. 6015 (N. Plns. Intertr. Ct, App. 1993).

See Id. at 6015.

300 Id. (citation omitted).

T.A.T. CONST.art. VI, 5 3@).
Francis v. Wilkinson, at 60 16.
'03 Id. at 6016-6017; ctf: Santa Clara v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49,66-67 (1978) (stating federal review oftribal court
ICRA decisions is limited to habeas corpus).
3" Francis v. Wilkinson, at 6017.
301
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Injunctive relief would not satisfy an aggrieved party.. .At times, injunctive relief is no relief at
a~1.w305
The dissent's viewpoint illustrates the extent to which federal law relates to tribal affairs.
It also raises the question whether the People should consider amending the Constitution to
provide for more than injunctive relief. However, whenever sovereign immunity is considered, a
waiver of sovereign immunity affects the sustainability of the tribal purse. Therefore, an
intriguing question is whether the People would be the best judge of whether to waive sovereign
immunity. The balance of power may favor that the government make this decision so that the
government which controls tribal funds can appropriately tailor the waiver of sovereign
immunity, if any. Therefore, any changes to sovereign immunity should be weighed very
carefully.

The Court's Interpretation of the Indian Civil Ftights Act
Among other provisions, the Indian Civil Rights Act provides that no tribe shall deny to

any person the equal protection of its Iaws nor deny to any person liberty or property without due
process of law.)06 The Court has construed the due process clause to cover the alleged
deprivation of tribal hnds as community property when Councilmen grant bonuses or merit pay
to themselves.307The Court agreed that it is well established in the field of Indian law and the
law of the Three Affiliated Tribes that each member has an interest in communal property
whether or not the property would actually go to a certain member. This interest in property was
found to be sufficient under the due process clause.308

Id. at 60 18.
'0625 U.S.C. §1302(8)
307
Bordeaux v, Wilkinson, 21 Indian L. Rep. 6231,6132 (Ft. Bert. Tr. Ct. 1993).
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Id

In another case, the Court construed the ICRA due process clause to protect a judge's
suspension with pay.309The defendant, Chairman Tex Hall, argued that a suspension with pay is
not cognizable under the due process clause of the ICRA.~" The Court disagreed and reasoned
that the right to serve the people of Fort Berthold and Judge Gillette's reputation and respect
were protected property rights under the due process clause of the ICRA.~"
The Tribal Court has also construed the equal protection clause of the Lndian Civil Rights
Act. T h e e opinions by three different judges demonstrate that the Court's interpretation of this
clause is challenged by unique situations. First, in a case discussed in the previous section, the
Public Defender successfully moved to dismiss ten pending cases against criminal defendants on
the grounds of equal protection and due process because of the Council's failure to hire a
prosecutor to investigate and prosecute Councilman Mark

FOX.^'^

Second, Special Judge Pommersheim considered whether the plaintiff's argument that
.P
\,

Council members awarded either themselves or family members grazing units violated equal
protection because the Council failed to exclude themselves and their families £i-omthe award
process.313He held that the plaintiffs presented a valid interest in property, a leasehold interest
under the due process clause.314However, Judge Pommersheim held that there was no violation
of equnlprolection under the minimum rationality

309
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Gillette v. Hall, 26 Indian L. Rep. 6028, 6029 (Ft. Bert. Tr. Ct. 1998).
Id.

3 1 1 Id.
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Matter of Consolidated Criminal Cases, 25 Indian L. Rep. 6062,6062-6063 (Ft. Bert. Tr. Ct. Nov. 1997); See
discussion on page 46.
313
Hall v. Tribal Business Council, 23 Indian L. Rep. 6039, 6040-6041 (Ft. Bert. Tr. Ct. 1996).
3'4 ~ dat. 604 1.
Id. Although Judge Pommersheim used scrutiny levels, later opinions did not invoke scrutiny levels for equal
protection or due process.
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The third case, Half v. Lakeside State Bank of New Town, is a much-criticized ruling of
,

the Fort Berthold

A midterm election was called and for the first time a sitting

Councilman, Tex Hall, was elected at large as

hai inn an.^'^

Tex Hall's Chairmanship raised

several constitutional questions, among them the question of how to fill his former Mandaree
segment seat.318Tex Hall decided that he could not resign his Councilman seat until a
replacement was duly appointed; however, as duly elected Chairman, he could not abandon that
Accordingly, to break a tie he voted twice on his successor to the Mandaree

post

segment seat.320 The opposing Councilmen challenged the double vote as a denial of equal
protection and due process under the I C R A . ~ ~ '
The Court held that in this limited situation "where a sitting tribal councilperson is
elected as Tribal Chairman and where the Chairman votes twice, once as a segment
representative and once as the Chairman, on the single issue of how to fill his vacated seat.. .,"
f

.,

such action does not violate the Indian Civil Rights A C ~ . The
~ ~ Court
*
went on to hold that if
Hall had not voted twice, his inaction would have violated the rights of the Mandaree segment.
The Court wrote, "Strange as it may sound, Hall's actions in voting twice protected the rights of
the Mandaree segment to equal protection of the
It is unclear whether the Court addressed the claims of the other Councilmen as to their
segments' equal protection rights or whether the Court avoided this question and addressed only

Telephone Interview with Diane Johnson, Former Practicing Attorney & Judge Fort Berthold TribaI Court (Dec.
2000) (stating even the author, 3.J. Jones, has second-guessed his opinion).
317
See Hall v. Lakeside Stare Bank of New Town, 26 Indian L. Rep. 6032,6033 (Ft. Bert. Tr. Ct. 1998).
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the Mandaree segment's rights if Hall had not voted twice. For this opinion the Judge faced

\

criticism and has been called "Two-vote

ones."^^^

In conclusion, the People have four rights: the right to elect the Council; the right to
amend the constitution; the right to call for a referendum; and the rights under the ICRA as
construed by the Court. Some of these provisions could be revised; however, these rights are
probably adequate especially in light of the Court's interpretation of the IClZA.

VIII. COMPARISON
OF THE MODERN
INDIAN REORGANIZATION
ACTCONSTITUTIONAL
GOVERNMENT
WITH THE TRADITIONAL
GOVERNMENT
Some scholars state that the ICRA boilerplate constitutions do not reflect traditional tribal
governments but should in some manner.325This section attempts to evaluate the truth of this
statement for Fort Berthold by referring to the historical structure of the government and by
discussing how to integrate specific cultural values into the current ICRA Constitution of the

r<,
Three Affiliated Tribes.
The task of balancing cultural structures of power and cultural values of the Three Tribes
into the modem Self-Determination era is quite challenging. When tribal members, unlike
scholars, are confronted with this question, some inevitably respond, "We can't go
There is no doubt that the Three Affiliated Tribes cannot go back to a Eull traditional
government. In fact, there are valid limits to tradition. For example, the Crow Tribe, historically
related to the Hidatsa, has a constitutional provision stating that every member is also a member
of the

'"

This provision is related to the tradition of allowing everyone a voice in the

Telephone Interview with Diane Johnson, Former Practicing Attorney & Judge Fort Berthold Tribal Court (Dec.
2000).
325
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supra note 3, at 65.
326 Interview with MHA Elders, at Fort Berthold, ND (March 14, 200 1).
327
Discussion with Stephanie Pretty Weasel, Member Crow Tribe, in Albuq., NM (February 2001).
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~ o u n c i l The
. ~ ~large
~ Crow Council has proved unworkable because Council meetings are too
long and the Council cannot act quickly but must wait for consensus of the entire membership.
Accordingly, the Crow Tribe is looking for ways to reduce the membership of the ~ o u n c i l . ~ ~ ~
On the other hand, there has to be valid and hctional ways to implement culture into the

modem era. Therefore, at minimum, there must be some open discussion about this subject.
First, the IRA form of government is generally consistent with the historical government
in that the Three Tribes did use councils.330However, there are several variations. The IRA
Council is elected, whereas the historical Council Members rose to power through prestige and
the consent of public opinion. Today there is one Chairman, and not two chiefs. Also, there is
currentIy only one Council, whereas each historic village had its own Village Council. There is
a cap on the number that may serve on the Council, whereas historically there was no defined
limit to membership. In fact, chiefs "retired" to belong to the Council when they were replaced
;
\

with younger chiefs.
There is Iess accountability of the Council to the People. Although the Council members
are elected, there is no natural mechanism for their removal as there was in the traditional

government where new leaders replaced the chiefs.
More importantly, however, the current structure removes the historical rights of the
People to disband or to remove their support for Tribal Council officials when they disapprove of
government action. It may be difficult to include some of these traditions because the Tribe may
encounter problems similar to the Crow Tribe. Perhaps, however, it would be easier to

Id.
See generally, Eric Lemont & Cheryl Powell, Crow Constitutional Development, Empowering the Crow Nation
(April 1999).
330
See also WEATHERFORD,
supra note 40 at 144 (stating that most tribes used councils for decision making: "In
0.
almost every North American tribe, clan, or nation for which we have detailed political information, the supreme
authority rested in a group rather than in an individual.").
328
329

implement the historical voice of the People through amending the Constitution to include a
recall provision. Such a provision has been proposed by the Constitutional Revision Committee.
The People have voiced their dissatisfaction with Council members and their inability to remove
them prior to expiration of their

The Constitutional Revision Committee proposed the

power to recall elected tribal
The Tribal Council approved the Committee's proposed amendment with 6 of 7 members
present, and with 5 members constituting a quorum. The vote was 4 for, 1 opposed, 1 abstained
and 0 members not voting.333The Secretary of the Interior is required to hold a special election
to vote on amendments under the constitution.334The Secretary did not call an election,
however, and accordingly, this amendment failed.33s It should be noted, too, that the
membership is discouraged when Tribal govenunent reform effotts fail because the federal
government has failed to complete required actions.
Second, the new government does not provide for express control by the clans as for
example the Mandan tradition of appointing a peace and war chief one from each moiety. Third,
the new government may allow fox department heads and appointed leaders but it doesn't
provide for the overall participation in government by all people. On the other hand, anyone

may still attend Council meetings.

"' The Special Committee for Constitutional Amendment Process, Interim Report 24 (May 5, 1998).
332 The

procedure included the delivery of a petition to the Executive Secretaxy of the Tribal Business Council with
the signature of at least 5 1% of qualified voters who voted in the last district election for a Council Member or in the
last general election in the case of the chairman. Resolution No. 98-80 (1998). The Executive Secretary has 30 days
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set a recall election administered by a five member Election Board. Id. Within 90 days of the certification the recall
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within 90 days, "the affected mbal official shall be deemed removed from office." Id.
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334 T.A.T. CONST.
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335
Interview with Phyllis Old Dog Cross, Member of the Constitutional Revision Committee, at Fort Berthold,
North Dakota (March 14,2001).

Finally, a more simple expression of tradition is through the Court. The Court has been
(-?*

able to apply tribal custom particularly in regards to the ICRA discussed in the previous section.
Interestingly, because of an emphasis on tribal rights, this at times may run contrary to individual
rights.
The Tribal Court has jurisdiction to construe tribal tradition and culture.336The Tribal
Court uses custom when it is needed and presented by the parties and when the custom can
h c t i o n in the modern age.337Additionally, the Court will reject custom when it is argued as a
mere pretext.338

In a good example of the need for custom, the Court considered whether a tribal member
owned the Hidatsas' copy of the 1851 Fort Laramie Treaty document and could therefore sell
it.339 The Court heard testimony fiom the Tribe's expert witness, Tillie

Ms. Walker

testified that the current possessor of the Treaty of Fort Laramie received it fiom his father and
"7
I

grandfathers who received it from Chief Four Bears of the ~ i d a t s a . ~Chief
~ ' Four Bears went to
the Fort Laramie Conference to represent the Mandan as well as the ~ i d a t s a He
. ~ requested
~~
a
Treaty for the Mandan Tribe too, but received only one. Before he lei? for Fort Laramie,
religious leaders told Four Bears about religious sites and landmarks that needed protection. Ms.

336

See generally In The Matter of the Guardianship and Conservatorship of William Bell, Sr., 24 Indian L. Rep.
6105, 6106 (Ft. Bert. Tr. Ct. 1997).
337
Id.at 6106; Telephone Interview with Diane Johnson, Former Practicing Attorney & Judge Fort Berthold Tribal

Court (Dec. 2000).
338 Telephone Interview with Diane Johnson, Former Practicing Attorney & Judge Fort Berthold Tribal Court (Dec.
2000).
339 See In The Matter of the Guardianship and Conservatorship of William Bell, Sr., 24 Indian L. Rep. 6105, 6105
(Ft. Bert.Tr. Ct. 1997).
"O Id. at 6106.
341 Id. at 6105-6107.
342 Id.at 6106.

Walker testified that when Chief Four Bears accepted the Treaty he accepted it not for himself
P.

but on behalf of his people.343
The Treaty was a symbol and official certification that Four Bears had entered into a
treaty with the United

Four Bears became a designated "Keeper" of the Treaty.

According to custom, he served as a trustee but did not own the document.345The Three
Affiliated Tribes was the "HoIder" of the document.346Four Bears passed the Treaty on to his
oldest son until it reached the present possessor according to custom. The Court found that "the
tradition of 'Keeper' and 'Holder' can be maintained even in this modern age."347 Accordingly,
the Court held that the current possessor did not own the document and permanently enjoined the
possessor and his family and the entire tribe from ever selling it.348

The Court stated,
It is the decision of this court that the original copy of this historic agreement
given to Chief Four Bears 150 years ago cannot be sold by Wilma Nelson
[daughter of the "Keeper"]. It cannot be sold by the Tribal Council. It cannot be
sold by anyone. It is not a part of the Conservatorship of William Bell, Sr.
rKeepern]. It is as sacred to the Hidatsa Nation as the original copy of the
Declaration of Independence is to the United States of ~ m e r i c a . ~ ~ ~
The Court declared that the Tribal Council would serve as "Holder" on behalf of the Three
Affiliated Tribes and further ordered that "the tribal business council as "Holder" was forever
enjoined from selling, or transferring the possession or ownership of this treaty document,"350

343

Id.

3uId.

Id.
Id.
347 Id.
345

346

Id. at 6106-6107.
Id. at 6106 (emphasis added).
350 Id. at 61064107; See also Bell, Jr. v. Nelson, 25 Indian L. Rep. 6032,6034 (N. Plns.Intertr. Ct. App. 1998)
(affirming the decision of the lower court).
jQ9

In conclusion, the general structure of the Council is similar to the traditional government

PI.

of the TAT. However, it is also distinct in several ways. The People should consider what

values they still support fiom their history and tradition and whether these values could be
maintained in the current governing structure and current Self-Determination era.

IX.

CONCLUSION

The Three Affiliated Tribes granted a11 governmental power to one representative entity,
the Tribal Council. The Tribal Council exercises mostly legislative powers and executive power.
The Tribal Council has acted to delegate power to the Tribal Court system but unfortunately, this
system is at the mercy of the Council. However, the system is quite effective because there is a
statutory separation of powers between the Council and the Court. The Court has also actively
used its role to enforce the ICRA whether or not it has explicit constitutional jurisdiction over

ICRA claims. The People retained in themselves the right to amend the Constitution, to elect
,P..

Council Members, to have a referendum election on actions by the Council, and through
intervention of the federal government, certain civil rights in the Indian Civil Rights Act.
I have recommend and explored several changes but my main recommendation is that the

Tribe conduct an open discourse on the values of the TAT. The People should discuss the values
they want their government to reflect and those that they do not want to include. Only then will
the PeopIe be able to effectively evaluate their Constitution.
The time is ripe to begin to formulate research and public opinion about the values that
should be included in the Constitution. The next steps should involve compiling ~ b ainput,
l
interpreting tribal surveys, and holding tribal community meetings.

A more difficult question is who should lead the discussion, the People, the Council or
the MHA Elders? As stated in the beginning of this paper, there is a split in the Elders as to

r'~,

n

whether the MHA Elders should lead this discussion or whether the Council should. Therefore, I
will leave this paper with a challenge from one MHA Elder:
We need to separate the powers again. We have so much more resources to work
with at the present time, both human and natural. We have large sums of money,
valuable resources, our leadership is more educated, and the work force is greater
and also more educated. Come on you in the leadership role, reach way down
into your soul and bring out that "Indigenous" in you. You all have it in you and
we are counting on ou. Let's get that unemployment down and make history of
welfare once again.3 8
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